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Re:Infosec's inability to quantify risk by Animats on Saturday July 25, 2015 @02:01PM (#9948389)
"Quantifying risk" statistically is meaningful when the risk is triggered by random events. It's not meaningful against an intelligent enemy.

In the early days of commercial security, the enemy was usually lone "hackers". Today, it's organized crime and nation-states. Consider "spear-phishing", aimed at people in key positions, which appears to be how someone (China?) got the entire background check records of most Federal employees. That was statistically unlikely, but as an attack, was worth it.

Too much of computer security is based on defense against large numbers of nuisance attacks. Military thinking on defense starts from "what's the worst they can do to us". It's about capability, not intent. Military organizations have to be aware that kids throwing rocks at the perimeter fence is not the real security threat; it's somebody seemingly authorized getting inside and getting to the good stuff.

Re:Infosec's inability to quantify risk by Spooky23 on Saturday July 25, 2015 @02:40PM (#9948533)
You are 100% correct. One of the best explanations of this that I've heard recently was on this interview with Brian Snow on the security weekly podcast: http://wiki.securityweekly.com/wiki/index.php/Episode332

I think the discussion was in the second half of the podcast.

I deal with infosec people all of the time, and the devotion to risk models (with questionable calculations of risks) is usually annoying, and in many cases whitewashing real issues.