Re:On the Value of Not Knowing Everything
by pron on Saturday July 18, 2015 @01:24AM
(#9906670)
> Is there a difference?
Of course there is. A consensus may shift, or be challenged. In some societies there was a consensus that harming many people -- of a particular race -- is a good thing. In many other societies it was widely held that some people are subhuman, and therefore may, and should, be subjugated.
> Wondering whether belief under particular circumstances is "really" knowledge is as meaningless as wondering whether a glider is really an aeroplane
Why is that meaningless? Because it has no physical consequences? Again, you assume that physical consequences are more meaningful than mental games, but it is you who gives them that meaning, and you can change the rules.
> When you get down to empirical predictions (and empirical predictions inside the world of Minecraft are no less empirical) - Will someone predict correctly? Will this object fly? Will my friend laugh at this quote? - the confusion goes away.
True, because there is only one (presumably) physical reality. But why does that matter that the confusion goes away? It is we who are confused, and we who make the predictions. You've decided that less confusion is better. But those are your rules, not some objective truth. I fully agree that when you want to build an airplane, you'd better use the scientific method if you want it to fly. But when you want to ponder the morality of something, confusion might be helpful. And it is you who decides how meaningful pondering ethics is vs. flying in an airplane, and those value preferences may change in one person, or vary from one person to another.
> and my experience is that humanities graduates are no better at producing those things than those who are not.
That's because the thing that produce wonder or beauty in your simulated world are things that reduce confusion. Many other people are not like that. I don't think we, as a society, would be better off if only one of those groups existed, or if one of them were to be much larger than the other. These are not new ideas, BTW. The struggle of humanities vs. science is part of a bigger struggle of empiricism vs. mystery that has been one of the defining features of modernity. Thomas Mann wrote a masterpiece about it: The Magic Mountain.
> What is it that they're erroneous about? Surely not the subjective parts, by definition; it's only on the objective, ...
It's more complicated than that (not in their case; they're wrong about pretty much everything, but it the general sense). Yes, you can be wrong about the objective parts, but you can also be wrong -- or, rather, primitive -- about the subjective parts. There are levels of refinement of thought in the humanities. It's like a child's drawing -- it's not wrong per se but it won't be put in the museum either (unless it's an exhibition about how children view the world). It's why some people in these parts are angry that Ayn Rand has never been considered a serious philosopher. But her thoughts were adolescent and unrefined, and so, like a child's drawing, are not worthy of serious consideration (maybe serious psychological consideration -- like a child's drawing -- but not philosophical considerations).
I can tell you one thing. It is often the people with the more primitive thinking who are less confused and less tormented, precisely because they've never learned to consider questions from various perspectives (even if they've learned to do so in math). Many scientists were very easily swayed by notions of racial inferiority, and quickly proceeded to find ample "scientific" evidence for that. They were very much certain and un-confused, yet not any less wrong. Of course, you might say that their fault was not truly engaging the true scientific method and their critical thinking -- and I agree. But things mesh together and every one of us -- including scientists -- view physical reality only as it is reflected in our simulated worlds, and sometimes the simulation can really twist things.
Would it be better if our simulated worlds were more regular and more precise? That's an unanswerable question. Better for what? And for whom? We certainly wouldn't be the same beings.
> I think that we think more clearly and make better decisions at that level.
You may be right, but so what? Who says that's better? Dostoyevsky wrote Notes from Underground about that (the protagonist is a man, a very neurotic man, who finds freedom -- or convinces himself so -- only in spite and self-harm). It is we who decide what's meaningful for us, and what we want our inner world to contain.
> And yet, in ordinary, everyday life, no-one finds the word confusing.
Sure, because we normally use that world as a synonym for physical reality. I don't find that word confusing either. But you imbue it with intrinsic, rather than functional value, and that's why it deserves closer examination. Physical reality is extremely useful -- to build an airplane, find a cure, or testify in court -- but to us as human beings a feeling of, say, betrayal, is real and meaningful whether it's objective or not.
There is an interesting duality between objective and subjective reality. What is meaningful for one can be seen as a psychological pathology to an outside observer, and it is often useful to look at things from both perspectives. As you seem to like everyday life so much, I can tell you that scientific facts have rarely motivated people to action -- or changed consensus -- as much as abstract, subjective ideas (like fascism or communism). You can view this from the outside and say that we have a physical psychology that works this way and can be manipulated or "hacked", or from the inside, and say that in each of our simulated worlds, some imagined realities play a bigger role than physical reality.
Of course there is. A consensus may shift, or be challenged. In some societies there was a consensus that harming many people -- of a particular race -- is a good thing. In many other societies it was widely held that some people are subhuman, and therefore may, and should, be subjugated.
> Wondering whether belief under particular circumstances is "really" knowledge is as meaningless as wondering whether a glider is really an aeroplane
Why is that meaningless? Because it has no physical consequences? Again, you assume that physical consequences are more meaningful than mental games, but it is you who gives them that meaning, and you can change the rules.
> When you get down to empirical predictions (and empirical predictions inside the world of Minecraft are no less empirical) - Will someone predict correctly? Will this object fly? Will my friend laugh at this quote? - the confusion goes away.
True, because there is only one (presumably) physical reality. But why does that matter that the confusion goes away? It is we who are confused, and we who make the predictions. You've decided that less confusion is better. But those are your rules, not some objective truth. I fully agree that when you want to build an airplane, you'd better use the scientific method if you want it to fly. But when you want to ponder the morality of something, confusion might be helpful. And it is you who decides how meaningful pondering ethics is vs. flying in an airplane, and those value preferences may change in one person, or vary from one person to another.
> and my experience is that humanities graduates are no better at producing those things than those who are not.
That's because the thing that produce wonder or beauty in your simulated world are things that reduce confusion. Many other people are not like that. I don't think we, as a society, would be better off if only one of those groups existed, or if one of them were to be much larger than the other. These are not new ideas, BTW. The struggle of humanities vs. science is part of a bigger struggle of empiricism vs. mystery that has been one of the defining features of modernity. Thomas Mann wrote a masterpiece about it: The Magic Mountain.
> What is it that they're erroneous about? Surely not the subjective parts, by definition; it's only on the objective, ...
It's more complicated than that (not in their case; they're wrong about pretty much everything, but it the general sense). Yes, you can be wrong about the objective parts, but you can also be wrong -- or, rather, primitive -- about the subjective parts. There are levels of refinement of thought in the humanities. It's like a child's drawing -- it's not wrong per se but it won't be put in the museum either (unless it's an exhibition about how children view the world). It's why some people in these parts are angry that Ayn Rand has never been considered a serious philosopher. But her thoughts were adolescent and unrefined, and so, like a child's drawing, are not worthy of serious consideration (maybe serious psychological consideration -- like a child's drawing -- but not philosophical considerations).
I can tell you one thing. It is often the people with the more primitive thinking who are less confused and less tormented, precisely because they've never learned to consider questions from various perspectives (even if they've learned to do so in math). Many scientists were very easily swayed by notions of racial inferiority, and quickly proceeded to find ample "scientific" evidence for that. They were very much certain and un-confused, yet not any less wrong. Of course, you might say that their fault was not truly engaging the true scientific method and their critical thinking -- and I agree. But things mesh together and every one of us -- including scientists -- view physical reality only as it is reflected in our simulated worlds, and sometimes the simulation can really twist things.
Would it be better if our simulated worlds were more regular and more precise? That's an unanswerable question. Better for what? And for whom? We certainly wouldn't be the same beings.
> I think that we think more clearly and make better decisions at that level.
You may be right, but so what? Who says that's better? Dostoyevsky wrote Notes from Underground about that (the protagonist is a man, a very neurotic man, who finds freedom -- or convinces himself so -- only in spite and self-harm). It is we who decide what's meaningful for us, and what we want our inner world to contain.
> And yet, in ordinary, everyday life, no-one finds the word confusing.
Sure, because we normally use that world as a synonym for physical reality. I don't find that word confusing either. But you imbue it with intrinsic, rather than functional value, and that's why it deserves closer examination. Physical reality is extremely useful -- to build an airplane, find a cure, or testify in court -- but to us as human beings a feeling of, say, betrayal, is real and meaningful whether it's objective or not.
There is an interesting duality between objective and subjective reality. What is meaningful for one can be seen as a psychological pathology to an outside observer, and it is often useful to look at things from both perspectives. As you seem to like everyday life so much, I can tell you that scientific facts have rarely motivated people to action -- or changed consensus -- as much as abstract, subjective ideas (like fascism or communism). You can view this from the outside and say that we have a physical psychology that works this way and can be manipulated or "hacked", or from the inside, and say that in each of our simulated worlds, some imagined realities play a bigger role than physical reality.