> the entire framework of a space-time containing objects, the fundamental organization of our perceptual systems, that must be recognized as a mere species-specific mode of perception rather than an insight into objective reality.
It seems this research can address the Schrödinger’s desk problem in two ways, which I can’t quite tie together:
1) By their conscious agent -> microphysical object theory, your desk doesn’t disappear like that. That is, dynamics of conscious agent interaction do routinely cause particle reconfigurations that reflect as certain patterns of change in relevant microphysical objects’ space-time positions, but—as long as we’re unable to describe the underlying world—“whoops! desk broke” is all we see.
2) By their interface theory of perception, your desk, as icon on your reality interface, pops up in your consciousness whenever it’s brought up for access. In other circumstances it doesn’t exist, like this browser window when I switch to another desktop (the data about my window and your desk is persisted by relevant interface layers). It would be fun if we could tinker with whatever mechanism implements these icons, given that the implementation is within us, but—in apparent absence of such ability within scientific framework—this remains more of a philosophical argument.
AFAICT, though, there’s at least one definite practical implication—we might have a reasonable way to construct meaningful observers and thus advance quantum theory interpretations.
We all know that there isn't really a desk in front of me, just a pile of atoms, and when I look at it, I'm not seeing the desk but observing photons that bounced off of it. Our interactions with things are always mediated, and the things are never what we think they are. It's also pretty standard for philosophers to debate whether anything is real, or whether we can possibly know that anything is real. Recasting the electrons in my desk as conscious agents doesn't make my desk disappear when I go out to lunch in some new and meaningful way.