What do you trust more, OpenVPN with a port forward to an SSH server behind it, or a directly exposed SSH agent? Which will properly authenticate users without exposing any possible auth bypass, RCE, DoS, side channels, or potential vulnerabilities?
In general it's best if you can assume a perimeter firewall (i.e. VPN) will not always succeed in keeping the bad packets out. Of course it's a cop out to simply say "do both".
In general if you are managing a larger number of servers, it's not practical to MFA to each one individually / interactively. So you are forced to MFA to the border, and SFA to the individual servers. If you have a small number of servers you may find you get more fine-grain control, better auditing, and fewer points of failure to do something like this article suggests -- skip the OpenVPN and implement fully server-side validated MFA directly to the server.
The ultra-paranoid would add an HMAC based port-knocking scheme and forget about primitives like fail2ban. This could either be based on a 3rd factor or reusing the existing private key.
My own opinion is if you have few enough servers and no other reason for a VPN, then expose SSH on a non-standard port or use a port knocker, and use something like this article's MFA solution.
The non-standard port or port knocking is really just to keep spam out of your logs. Since authentication requires a 4096 bit private key, you're not worried about brute force in any case.
In SSH, you can tunnel ports, but that only secures traffic at that port. You can use a SOCKS proxy, but that only secures traffic configured to go through it. You can use the -w option and use IP forwarding, but then you're running TCP/IP over the SSH protocol which is bad. This is the closest you'll get to emulating what a VPN provides.