Because that wouldn't be compatible with existing IPv4 deployments and would cause a reliability havoc when a node not configured to deal with it mangled packets transparently somewhere in between your source and destination end-points.
I don't get the resistance against IPv6. It works. It's a fresh take. Yes it requires some new stuff to be deployed and configured here and there, maybe even requires you to learn something new, but if you thought extending IPv4 would have been any other way you are deluding yourself.
If you're going to do a significant change to something as big as the internet (and introducing a new address scheme is that, no matter how you implement it), you might as well step back and think it all through instead of applying yet another hack.
So tell me. Why are you opposed to IPv6? Why do you want to hang on to this old IPv4-thing which is already at the bursting point, at the edge of what it can take?
http://www.spinics.net/linux/fedora/fedora-users/msg459370.h... (tldr: It's 2015, yet the default firewall in a major Linux distro can't handle IPv6)
I'm very concerned about implications for anonymity. If every device has a unique IPv6 address, then just one leak can compromise all other anonymized connections.
IPv4 did not offer any anonymity. The closest you get to that, is an external entity being unable to differentiate the traffic you make vs the one your family makes.
IP isn't anonymous; it wasn't designed to be, and probably (given the problems it's trying to solve) shouldn't be. Anonymity should be an overlay.
I totally agree, though, anonymity is not part of IP. I was not implying that, just that there are still ways for home users to somehow shuffle their IPs within the IPv6 framework.
I get that the Tor Project is working on IPv6. But I also want IPv6 NAT, in pfSense or whatever. That's to keep my local device IPv6 addresses (hosts and VMs) private, even from Tor entry guards. I guess that it's time to learn how to ensure that.
The opportunity to break backwards compatibility in v6 brought many other good things as well: fixed fields that are easier to route, more sane network allocation schemes, router discovery for LANs, and lots of other bits and pieces.
One of the many studies: http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2005/EECS-2005-24...
Any solution will involve some changes to network infrastructure.
If they had simply added some bytes to the address and not tried to tackle every other perceived wrong with IPv4, we wouldn't be talking about this exact same problem 17 years after IPv6 was introduced.
Could you explain what this means?
But do you have a way to discover whether any of the first hundred devices break soon? Or even the 150 new devices? You could add a device on a new-only address before you run completely out of the old-compatible addresses, but that won't test completely. There might still be devices that will connect, but log the connections improperly, or have a buffer overrun and crash randomly, or, or, or. There might be software on a device that supports only old addresses, even though the device itself supports the extension scheme.
If the network is a big one, where different parties own and operate the devices, then you may well be completely unable to test whether the extension scheme is universally supported. Before the day when you run completely out of unextended addresses, that is.
Contrast this with a dualstack approach, where you can make a list at any time: THESE devices are on v4 only and will be a problem when v4 runs out, THOSE OTHERS are on v4+v6.
You could even have made IPv4 addresses variable length this way, from 32 up to a very large number of bits, and hierarchical. And it's relatively easy to make such a scheme backwards compatible, because you can have (say) a webserver sitting on 1.2.3.4 answering queries for older clients that don't know how to form a 1.2.3.4.5.6 address packet.