It seemed like pre-9/11 the NSA was doing both of their roles (spy and strengthen) but since 9/11 all they do is spy and ignore the other role.
Maybe that role should be moved out of the NSA completely, and they can just concentrate on spying and let someone else concentrate on improving digital security. It is fair to say that those two roles are somewhat contradictory.
Privilege escalation on stock Linux systems has never been a major challenge, attackers can then simply turn off SELinux or modify the rules once they get root - as plenty of public exploit PoCs have demonstrated. Which is more of a indication of the state of Linux kernel security rather than MAC software.
Sysadmins seem to talk highly of SELinux, but its rare to find people in offensive infosec who do.
Not to mention attackers can use SELinux toolsets to gain root: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2015/q1/1011
https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/05/13/venom-dont-get-bi...
I could easily find a dozen plus 0day attacks which SELinux mitigated in Fedora/CentOS/RHEL, but there is no point in responding to a troll with much more than the minimum necessary.
SELinux is very much geared in mind to the often baroque security protocols of government agencies, defense companies and certain enterprises. It may be cryptic for many other use cases.