More importantly, however, you want updates to be a routine frequent thing so you don't train people to ignore them or let the backlog build up to the point where the size itself becomes a deterrent to updating because too many things will change. If you install updates regularly, you keep changes smaller and keep the focus on the tight reaction time which you'll need for serious vulnerabilities.
We think Docker, and containers in general, is a great way to deploy software -- the speed and agility is so much better than traditional approaches. This also means that we should have sound security practices in place from the very beginning, or else we could easily end up with insecure images floating around in several places (dev laptops to public cloud).
Complete agreement here – Docker's strong points are exactly the things which make patch deployment easier than in legacy environments. Hopefully we'll start seeing orchestration tools which really streamline the rebuild/partial deploy/monitor error rates/deploy more cycle when updates are available.
The libtasn1 bug seems to be only relevant if you're using GnuTLS. Again, not great but not the most widely used library either.
Cutting those two out cuts the number of vulnerable images in half and there's probably a few more rarely used programs with security issues further down the tail. Again, this isn't great, but it's not quite as terrible as the authors are making it to be.
The user supplied packages on the other hand seems to be quite a bit worse.