So are computers.
Whether that's the case in human cognition remains to be shown (else we're taking for granted what we're trying to prove).
That's not correct.
> The physical properties of the computer don't matter in this regard.
That's not correct.
> You could do exactly what a computer does with pen and paper (it would just take a much longer time).
Yes, and that time matters greatly as it's the difference between practical and hypothetical. Beyond that, programs that can evolve their hardware have been shown to come up with optimizations no human could have created and thus the physical properties of the computer do matter.
If we can bridge the simulated world to our world then we can interact with it.
Being in different worlds does not imply that it can never reach conciousness (among other properties). To imply that is invoking magic.
Anything from our world can be simulated.
To be literally "as real in its world (as we in ours)" several things need to happen:
1) its world should be an 1-1 simulated mapping of our world. Perhaps not to its whole extend (e.g. not the whole universe), but to ANY extend that affects the final result.
2) its world should have randomness equivalent to the quality of randomness (not sure if it's perfect) that our world has.
As for "Anything from our world can be simulated" -- that's a bold claim, provided that we haven't simulated ANYTHING at all yet, to the degree of interactions and complexity that exist in our world.
When we simulate the behavior of water in a fluids physics simulation, or the behavior of planets etc, it's amazing how much stuff we leave out. Our simulations are to a full-blown simulation what South Park cut-outs are to a photograph.
Besides, this notion reminds me of the naive 19th century ideas, that they could predict the course of the universe if only they had the details (motion, momentum, weight, etc) of all objects and the capacity to calculate their interactions. QM put a hole in that.
As for 2) likewise, randomness isn't a requirement, you're arbitrarily picking one quality and saying that quality has to be identical for it to be real. why? I don't believe that for a second.
I'm fully aware of the simplifications of simulation... being simplified compared to an external universe does not change the premise of it being real to its inhabitants. Quantum Mechanics does not say that the universe is not mechanistic, just that there is a random element (that in itself may ultimately be modelled).
It has, if it has to be "moisture" and also to be "just as real".
Else, you can define as "moisture" any parameter in the simulation (since it can be "whatever it likes").
E.g. the property of being "alive" in Conways Game of Life.
In what sense will that be a simulation of "moisture" and "just as real" inside the simulation as moisture is to us?
It's also not pure algorithm, it's a physical entity, tangible and with real world properties and interactions.
Who said (or proved) it's just an information processing device?