By "on your keyrings" I mean that quite a few PGP keys in the wild still use DSA-1024 master signing keys with (often much larger) ElGamal encryption subkeys (as DSA was not specified for a long time with keys beyond 2048-bits).
However, DSA-1024/(ElGamal-anything) is not a safe configuration anymore - an attacker who can do a discrete-log on a highly-valued 1024-bit finite field can recover the signing key, and sign things - including software released under that key, or grant themselves new encryption subkeys of any strength.
It may therefore be a good idea to review your PGP keyrings for any master keys you trust which fit that 1024-bits and below criteria (look for 1024D, or below), as they definitely are overdue an upgrade. You may find that a fruitful search, with a few surprises still. For example, to pick one high-profile signing key that would doubtless have been interesting to Nation-State Adversaries and would have been susceptible to such an attack: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0xE3BA7... ˙ ͜ʟ˙
The common safe configuration for modern OpenPGP (and upstream GnuPG's current default, I believe) is to use RSA signing keys and RSA encryption subkeys, each of at least 2048 bits - really I'd recommend 3072 or 4096 bits, as use of PGP is not as performance-sensitive as TLS and there is no forward secrecy, so I wouldn't really recommend going much below a ≈128-bit workfactor (equivalent to ≈3072 bit RSA or ≈256-bit elliptic-curve).
Edward Snowden trusted RSA-4096 signing and encryption keys with his life, and that obviously worked out fine for him at the time.
Can you please explain what you mean? Do you mean "those of you still using DSA-1024 anywhere" or do you mean that there is something we should do "on the PGP keyrings" specifically? Can we control how we maintain the keyrings? Is there some setting for the "key on the keyrings"? I ask since I don't know the state of the art of the formats of the keyrings.