> Finally, there's the case of using ChaCha20/Poly1305; should SSL Labs encourage the use of cipher suites that are not yet standardised?
Ie, I don't think it's worth encouraging CHACHA20/POLY1305 until people can use it.
We need to get away from the idea that it's unfair to recognize superior cryptography merely because it's currently only implemented in Chrome.
The grade either reflects the actual quality of a server's TLS configuration, or it reflects something else.
In any case, it's a moot point here, because ChaCha20/Poly1305 is RFC7593.
Accepting non-standard crypto is a slippery slope, which is why I'd rather take a very conservative approach.
P.S. You mean RFC 7539, which came out only a couple of days ago. Now we only need another RFC for the use in TLS.
That doesn't change that people won't use it until it's in openssl properly and they don't have to maintain a patched version themselves.
There are two options: enable the only modern native stream cipher available for TLS, and with it the only polynomial MAC that doesn't require hardware support (and thus the best polynomial MAC available for mobile devices), or don't.
The former option is superior to the latter option. The latter option is easier, but: nobody said engineering was supposed to be easy.
Either SSL Labs is evaluating the quality of TLS implementations, or they're evaluating something else. Arguments like the ones I see on this thread suggest it's "something else".
I think not negotiating GCM on a browser where GCM is available and not using it will produce a warning should cap the mark at a B.
Understood re: IE.
Agreed re: ChaCha20/Poly1305, at least until openssl ships it (and maybe longer).