HSTS partially prevents the MITM-over-http, but not 100% the person doing the MITM potentially controls the clock (NTP is unauthenticated). Unless you do HSTS by whitelisting the domain in the browser.
Security is hard :(
If you create a session for the logged-out user, you must be careful about not recycling the same session once logged in or you expose yourself to session fixation.
http://stephensclafani.com/2011/04/06/oauth-2-0-csrf-vulnera... and http://homakov.blogspot.com/2014/01/two-severe-wontfix-vulne... explain the issue pretty well.
Most advanced CSRF schemes use some crypto primitives in a manner like client-side sessions work (Enc+Mac on the server, give token to user, Validate Integrity+Dec on the server when you get it back), or HMAC some user meta-data. This allows you to distribute the key and then any server with the key can validate the token without needing to know the token in advance.
I've written a blog post about a bunch of types of CSRF schemes and their pros and cons, but never published it. Is this interesting enough for me to publish?
Definitely. Having looked myself, I can tell you there aren't many resources online that get this right.
Really the difference is that you compare the user's response to a known value on the server rather than two values in the same request body which cannot be independently verified.
Keep in mind that if you don't change the client's view of the token on every page load (using some kind of salt), you are potentially vulnerable to CRIME/BEAST.
For example, Cookie: SHA1(salt + secret), then CSRF-TOKEN header/value is taken, the salt extracted, hashed against the server-side secret and compared.