https://hn.algolia.com/?query=ssl%20expired&sort=byDate&pref...
I suspect the real issue is that in "emergency situations" people get the important shit done (and replace certs immediately), but don't always do the non-emergency process type stuff that'd normally get done when doing important shit by the schedule (updating reminders about cert expiry dates).
My guess is Instagram, senate.gov. gmail, and Docker (amongst others) are going to have ops people wandering around over the next few months saying "Hey, we just got the ssl cert update reminder, but someone's already renewed the cert months ago and didn't update 'the system(tm)'. What gives, people?"
A fix would be to update those new certificates proactively, spreading out the workload and new expiry times. But also marking the calendar for mass expiry day because there are bound to be some that were forgotten.
It may have produced a global phenomenon where people observe multiple expired certificates around that date; however, there is absolutely no difference to an end-user of a particular site whether the cert is expired in April or October. They are both as equally bad.
In response to heartbleed, a system admin would have gained no advantage by waiting to react and would have been exposing his/her users to MiTM attacks by waiting longer.