Imagine a scenario in which there are N Jews, N neoNazis (for simplicity: example works if the Jews simply believe the number of Nazis is approximately equal) and yN ordinary citizens. Each individual in those groups has an equal budget to distribute between initiatives V(1)...V(X), where X > 2.
neoNazis desire a "yes" vote for both initiatives V(1) and V(2) - let's call them "internment" and "pogroms" - so strongly that they are (or are believed to be) willing to forego all votes on initiatives V(3)...V(X) to pass them
Jews have similarly strong views on not being interned or the victim of pogroms, but in the absence of adequate information on how the neoNazis will use their votes cannot be assured of allocating their voting budget between V(1) and V(2) in a way sufficient to negate the votes of the neoNazis on both issues. (Note also that the existential threat posed by V(1) and V(2) sitting on the [future] referendum list also deters the Jews from using part of their budget to influence votes on V(3)...V(X) in ways which might improve their individual utilities)
If ordinary citizens have a preference for a "no" vote which would be sufficiently strong for them to vote against it in a regular referendum, but insufficiently strong for them to allocate voting budget that could otherwise purchase decisions on initiatives V(3)...V(X) the moderate majority will not provide the same bulwark against extremism as they do under a 1 person 1 vote system. If all or most Jews decide that pogroms are significantly worse than incarceration and are sufficiently risk averse to warrant allocating all their budget to eliminate the possibility of an equal number of Nazis enacting V(2), it's surprisingly easy and inexpensive in terms of voting budget for the Nazis to pass V(1). The only way I can see the Jews avoiding both initiatives being passed is to put the neoNazis on the defensive with an equally vicious anti-Nazi counter-proposal - assuming Nazis can be targeted as effectively as Jews - but I'm not convinced that mutually assured destruction is the ideal way of resolving voting conflicts.
Unfortunately, this also applies to less extreme examples where balloting is secret and intentions uncertain: in order to shift the Nash equilibrium of a particular proposal in your favour you simply raise the spectre of an [additional, and credible] proposal you anticipate your adversaries will like even less.
This isn't a problem if the individuals apportioning their vote budget are similarly-highly-motivated legislators prioritising from a known raft of policies whilst being well informed about which initiatives are most likely to meet with strong opposition (though it significantly advantages parties able to coordinate the efficient distribution of their votes). Probably they can handle the complexities of a voting budget that compensates the losers too.
But for a broader electorate that doesn't excel in performing stochastic optimisation problems, doesn't have good intelligence to help them vote tactically, doesn't know what future votes might be, the quadratic nature of the voting system doesn't deal with the problem of budgeted and secret voting being a game of iterated prisoners' dilemma; it might even intensify the problems.
It's not too difficult to devise a scenario in which it actually makes the "tyranny of the majority" problem worse: a minority of bigots wish very strongly to enact a law against a minority of regular targets. The disinterested majority wishes to avoid diluting their future voting power by participating, whilst the victimised minority wishes to hold back some of their voting power to avoid being disenfranchised when faced with conceivable future bullying initiatives[1]. In a secret ballot, the bigots can conceivably win if the groups are a similar size (even if they can subsequently reverse the decision)
[1]This is mitigated if the losers get their own votes back as compensation, but actually worsened if they get higher compensation, in which case optimum strategy in a iterated electoral battle is to win by the narrowest possible margin, whilst voting for something incredibly unpopular is a practical way to increase your future influence.