Re:Quadratic Voting (2014)
by jmount on Saturday May 02, 2015 @07:00PM
(#9478894)
My point is: it is a bad situation, equilibrium or not. And some down-winders have to vote if the factory votes a little bit each time. Or even if the factory threatens to vote (and then doesn't). If all the magic is in the nominating process- then we really don't need the voting mechanism.
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Agreed, but what I mean is it can't happen.
If it's not an equilibrium then it can't happen! That doesn't make the claim foolproof or anything-- maybe it's not actually an equilibrium for one reason or another we didn't foresee, but the phrase "it is a bad situation, equilibrium or not" is nonsensical.
Assuming that the proofs make perfect assumptions that exactly match real life, sure.
"the down-winders would not vote unless they thought that vote mattered." - this decision requires mental resources to make, and if the rational choice is too complex then many people wouldn't make it, breaking your assumptions.
Is there any research that tries to model the economic cost of coming to a "rational" decision (as defined by the voting game)?
Yes, in this paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012) I also consider the case where people make mistakes. You can study equilibrium even in models where people are not perfectly rational.