Re:Ask HN: Corporate monitoring?
by pervasivemon on Friday May 01, 2015 @12:37AM
(#9469464)
Yes, you probably should assume it is. The good news is that it's easily detectable. Your browser should refuse to connect to the proxy-spoofed gmail because it likely hasn't received the visited-corporation's local-spoofing-is-ok cert.
You might be encouraged by the local team -- "don't worry, just do this so you can access gmail again." It's too bad that this activity trains people to think updating your certificate store (based on directions given to you by some site in your web browser) is something that you should do to get past an error message.
> does anyone have knowledge that this occurs
If you have any doubts, click on the padlock icon using your browser. On Chrome, you can click "Connection" then "Certificate Information". It will display who the certificate was "Issued By" and "Issued To". Well-meaning eavesdropping corporations will likely confess their [or the device's manufacturer name] identity here.
And by "assume", I mean to say, does anyone have knowledge that this occurs?