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Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by JoshTriplett on Thursday April 30, 2015 @10:57AM (#9465443)
Having read the entire article, I'd say that while it's good to consider the implications of encrypting all traffic (including those mentioned in the article), it's perfectly reasonable to have done so and still come to the conclusion that every single one of those implications are entirely by design features, rather than bugs.

"Lawful intercept": sure, you have the right, good luck with that. We're not going to make the Internet less secure for the benefit of government interception; if anything, we're making it more secure because of the possibility of government interception. This one is a very old argument, and easily debunked: assuming you allow any encryption at all, just having less of it doesn't make lawful interception any easier, because of course all the illicit traffic will be encrypted. The only thing it does is make encrypted traffic seem more suspicious, which isn't good for anyone.

SNI works just about everywhere these days, and it's quite safe for most services to just turn it on and write off the few systems (IE on XP, and truly ancient mobile devices) that can't cope.

People don't get used to clicking certificate warnings away because browsers have gone out of their way to make that painful, and it should be.

If you don't understand TLS, learn, or count on other people to have learned. That's no excuse for not using it.

There are many folks working on fixing the CA problem, but even without that completely fixed, SSL is still better than cleartext.

All that said, I do think the first section of the article, about unintended affordances (such as emergencies) is worth considering in other technological contexts. That point was made years ago: http://code-is-law.org/

Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by the_mitsuhiko on Thursday April 30, 2015 @11:20AM (#9465591)
> "Lawful intercept": sure, you have the right, good luck with that. We're not going to make the Internet less secure for the benefit of government interception; if anything, we're making it more secure because of the possibility of government interception.

Government censorship is happening if you want it or not. The main difference is now that there is a lot more collateral damage with SSL deployed.

> If you don't understand TLS, learn, or count on other people to have learned. That's no excuse for not using it.

I agree in the sense that anyone who runs a security critical website should deploy SSL and there is no excuse for not doing it. However what triggered the whole article was that more and more websites become completely impossible to use in the absence of SSL even for anonymous data access.

Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by JoshTriplett on Thursday April 30, 2015 @11:55AM (#9465867)
> Government censorship is happening if you want it or not. The main difference is now that there is a lot more collateral damage with SSL deployed.

Good. Censorship and other attacks should be as noisy, obtrusive, and damaging as possible, so that we have more incentive to stop it (by both legal and technical means). Such attacks should not pass silently.

> However what triggered the whole article was that more and more websites become completely impossible to use in the absence of SSL even for anonymous data access.

Why do you need to use them in the absence of SSL?

Many ridiculously tiny devices still have enough power to run a simple TLS stack. And if you're really trying to access web services from some potato-powered device that can't run a TLS stack, you have much the same problems as a device that can't run a fully capable network stack at all. In either case, speak a simpler encrypted protocol (e.g. Bluetooth Low Energy, 6LoWPAN) to a local device, that can either provide the services you need or access them on your behalf.

Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by positivejam on Thursday April 30, 2015 @02:35PM (#9466831)
> Good. Censorship and other attacks should be as noisy, obtrusive, and damaging as possible

Agreed. It's human nature to not bother to speak up when a group you're not a part of is attacked. If widespread encryption means that more people will be affected when governments try to censor traffic, then I'd say we have one more argument for widespread encryption. http://hmd.org.uk/resources/poetry/first-they-came-pastor-ma...

Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by Nursie on Thursday April 30, 2015 @11:31AM (#9465671)
>> Government censorship is happening if you want it or not. The main difference is now that there is a lot more collateral damage with SSL deployed.

Excellent. It means that it's a lot more out in the open and noticeable.

>> owever what triggered the whole article was that more and more websites become completely impossible to use in the absence of SSL even for anonymous data access.

Also good, making sure there's a lot of uninteresting stuff under encryption means that the interesting stuff stands out less.

Also makes it harder for ISPs to alter content or inject advertising. A good thing.

Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by untitaker_ on Thursday April 30, 2015 @11:28AM (#9465647)
>However what triggered the whole article was that more and more websites become completely impossible to use in the absence of SSL even for anonymous data access.

How would you bootstrap a secure encrypted login for a user who was browsing the site without SSL? I agree with you that anonymous data access is often encrypted unnecessarily, but in practice deploying HTTPS is an all-or-nothing deal.

Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by the_mitsuhiko on Thursday April 30, 2015 @11:56AM (#9465870)
> How would you bootstrap a secure encrypted login for a user who was browsing the site without SSL?

If you have a website where users sign in you are pretty much left with SSL from the sign-in form on but you can move an indirection between the sign in and out so that a user has a chance to verify they are authenticating on the right site. Fundamentally there is no difference from the user's perspective for as long you are okay with moving the log-in box to a secure URL where the user can check the authentication.

Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by untitaker_ on Thursday April 30, 2015 @12:07PM (#9465931)
I mean that while browsing unencrypted, the user can be phished away from the site quite easily.
Re:Unintended Affordances (or why I believe encrypting every... by Lawtonfogle on Thursday April 30, 2015 @01:49PM (#9466539)
>Government censorship is happening if you want it or not. The main difference is now that there is a lot more collateral damage with SSL deployed.

Good. Make the censorship visible. Make it all or nothing. Force people to move to technologies that cannot be censored (or that at least are more resistant).

The alternative is to let the government censor everything they want and let people see only what the government approves of, with the latter just being easier to deploy and switch to the former if it ever crosses the line.