Re:Google Patent Purchase Promotion
by dragonwriter on Tuesday April 28, 2015 @05:36PM
(#9455299)
> Google certainly are doing this differently, and I even mentioned how (less flexible, more efficient, different narrative). But then every company that engages in this does it differently.
Even so Google is different in the high-level meta structure of how it is doing it differently, since it has a both an established and still operational more traditional, more flexible, more general, and less streamlined system and the new, experimental, less flexible, more specific, and more streamlined system. It's essentially do a public (not "visible only to insiders", though obviously the operational details of the results are unlikely to be public) real-business-at-stake side-by-side test of different options.
> As such I would guess Google will end up acquiring only those patents that are actually useful and people underprice.
I suspect that there are a wide range of potential patents that have expected value to Google that exceeds their expected value to most (and possibly any) other market participant that could actually muster the resources to pay that value, so I don't think "underpriced" is the only option.
I also don't think "useful" in the sense that the patent actually covers a useful invention is necessary, anything that might provide a remotely colorable case for a Google-hostile entity to use against something useful Google does or might do in the life of the patent (even if it doesn't actually cover the thing Google is concerned about, and even if it wouldn't survive scrutiny in a lawsuit) can have positive net utility for Google to secure to prevent a hostile party from doing so if the price tag is less than the expected cost of defeating it in a lawsuit times the probability of such a suit should a hostile party get a hold of it.
> Google may very well get some good patents submitted, but if they don't negotiate, they will either leave them on the table or pay more than they're worth.
Paying above-market price but spending less resources on the pre-purchase process than would be spent getting down to market price can be a net win. An even bigger net win if it makes Google such an attractive place to shop your patents that the most threatening patents that would otherwise get picked up by Google-hostile entities end up getting shopped to Google first.
Even so Google is different in the high-level meta structure of how it is doing it differently, since it has a both an established and still operational more traditional, more flexible, more general, and less streamlined system and the new, experimental, less flexible, more specific, and more streamlined system. It's essentially do a public (not "visible only to insiders", though obviously the operational details of the results are unlikely to be public) real-business-at-stake side-by-side test of different options.
> As such I would guess Google will end up acquiring only those patents that are actually useful and people underprice.
I suspect that there are a wide range of potential patents that have expected value to Google that exceeds their expected value to most (and possibly any) other market participant that could actually muster the resources to pay that value, so I don't think "underpriced" is the only option.
I also don't think "useful" in the sense that the patent actually covers a useful invention is necessary, anything that might provide a remotely colorable case for a Google-hostile entity to use against something useful Google does or might do in the life of the patent (even if it doesn't actually cover the thing Google is concerned about, and even if it wouldn't survive scrutiny in a lawsuit) can have positive net utility for Google to secure to prevent a hostile party from doing so if the price tag is less than the expected cost of defeating it in a lawsuit times the probability of such a suit should a hostile party get a hold of it.
> Google may very well get some good patents submitted, but if they don't negotiate, they will either leave them on the table or pay more than they're worth.
Paying above-market price but spending less resources on the pre-purchase process than would be spent getting down to market price can be a net win. An even bigger net win if it makes Google such an attractive place to shop your patents that the most threatening patents that would otherwise get picked up by Google-hostile entities end up getting shopped to Google first.