libnetsnmp used to make close to a million calloc() calls when responding to a query for a number of CPU sockets on the machine. That was kind of amazing in its sheer brazenness.
You're comparing a lightweight thing with a security policy driven message bus. Obviously the latter is going to be more expensive.
If you look at the Linus's trace, it's all heap and mutex operations. That's just sloppy internal design full of concurrency bottlenecks and lots of in-memory cloning. You certainly don't mean to imply that both are the only way to implement a "security policy driven message bus" software, do you?
Far from it. One of the core designs of kbus (which dbus cannot do because it's not in the kernel) is that you can seal the payload buffer from the sender so the receiver and use it safely concurrently without having to clone anything.
There is obviously a lot of general inefficiency in the userland libraries but not in the design of it.
That was created for KDBUS but has more use than than being used for KDBUS exclusively. It still was written for KDBUS.
The real problem is he doesn't give any data for volume/bandwidth processed in his case.
I don't see why a "security policy driven message bus" would be more expensive than what he describes (unzipping, business rules encorcement, analyzing, etc).
It was in comparison with an HTTP server. I did not read much about the mail thread but from what I can tell it essentially benchmarks the uninteresting part of DBUS which is the part that runs in userspace. That's old and definitely needs improvements, but not the design of it. In fact, the design of KDBUS or the DBUS dispatching core is from what I can tell quite intelligent and makes sense from a performance point of view.
Without a doubt there are a lot of old bells and whistles attached to DBUS which need rewriting.
Moores Law does not help it get more secure.
How about we work on things that mater in this post-Snowden world, like increasing security -- and let Moore do the performance improvements! Seems a more reasonable and efficient approach, no? Adding more attackable surface area to the Kernel is not a good idea at all. It is an NSA wet dream.
How I wish. Sure, for proprietary and commercial consumer-facing apps, it might be the case. There's a ton of proprietary/commercial development tools and infrastructure (hyper-optimized JVMs, k/kdb...) that are inverses of Wirth. FOSS has its opuses as well, but it's just as full of crap.
Amdahl's law only really makes sense in parallel computing.
Sure, but that doesn't mean one can just magic away blatant bottlenecks, and even if some speedup is possible, it does not retroactively make these decisions correct.
Contemporary computing is parallel computing. Even phones have multiple cores.
Heck, I have worked on an algorithmic trading platform that in the limit of 5us receives market data, dedups it (multiple multicast streams for redundancy), uncompresses it (fricking zlib), parses it, analyzes it, sends to multiple algorithms which decide if current market situation matches certain rules, decides and fills market order, the order gets inspected by independent mechanism to stop the algorithm if it malfunctions, and only then it gets sent to market, over TCP, which is another form of IPC.
All in the span of fricking 5us which is 40 times less than the benchmark suggests for this simple task. Granted, the algorithmic trading world goes to great lengths to avoid overhead including kernel overhead any kind of task switiching, branch prediction fails, etc. But still, come on, guys...