https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UK%E2%80%93US_extradition_trea...
In practice, UK citizens now have to obey US law or risk being extradited - in this case, for conducting their work legally in their home country.
This is not right.
Not a crime in the UK at the time http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/norris-loses...
UK citizen entrapped by US agent (entrapment would likely be thrown out of a UK court, but is now being tried in the US...): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christopher_Tappin
Even if the treaty is applied in this way, which it doesn't seem to be, US penalties are still not appropriate for UK citizens.
The UK has abolished the death penalty on human rights grounds - and yet the UK government can send someone over to the US for this punishment.
If you commit a UK crime on UK soil, you should be subject to UK punishment, and you should not be the subject of the law and punishment of any and all nations of the world.
Every European country extradites only on the provision that the death penalty will not be sought. It's also part of the ECHR.
Your last sentence suggests that your problem isn't the specifics of the extradition treaty, but rather the concept of extradition in general.
You misrepresent what I said. I don't particularly object to extradition for crimes committed in US law on US soil, although I do think countries have a responsibility to protect their own citizens first and foremost (which is surely the primary purpose of nations).
If an extradition treaty means I am effectively subject to inter-national law while in my home country, then I object, yes, very much.
"spoofing" has generally been outlawed since forever - at the very least since 1934. Dodd Frank may have defined spoofing better, but "intent to execute" (which, in imprecise language is the complement of "spoofing") has been a requirement for much much longer, and in every regulated exchange in just about any country.
But even if it was only outlawed in 2010 and only in the US - Sarao was trading the CME -- that's the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, thereby putting himself in the jurisdiction of US trading laws.
The problem is that the market is only capable of defending against what it is used to dealing with, if we "ban" scammers we end up with a market susceptible to scammers. If we "allow" everything we'll end up with markets that can withstand a sybil attacks. As another poster said, the "correct" metric is accepted offers, not outstanding offers. ("Correct" is complex of course...)
It's like passing laws making web-scraping for email addresses into hacking. It feels like it'll make us safer, but because "only criminals have guns" it just ends up shooting a few people in the foot and weakening us overall against actual threats.
That's like saying "we can't legislate vendors don't do a bait-and-switch" or "we can't legislate against false advertising". We can, we have, and it made life better for society at large. The false advertising arms race is still on - but the collateral damage to consumers is significantly smaller than it was before those laws were enacted.
We can legislate "don't spoof", and we have (for some proverbial we), but any law is useless without enforcement - and there is no enforcement for these regulations. Additionally, at present the SEC is a part of the spoofing arms race, and is massively (and some say willingly due to regulatory capture) underfunded and incompetent in that race with no intent to win.
You want to legislate it so that it has teeth? Publish pseudonymized order flow six months after the fact (changing identifiers every day, for example), and give someone who can use this data to prove spoofing 10% of the proceeds of any fines levied thanks to their work. (Sure, pseudonymity is hard, and may be impossible. But 6 months after the fact is enough time for that to matter little in case of trades).
You want to stop it without changing enforcement mechanism? Charge for unexecuted orders, or otherwise limit their numbers. In fact, some european exchanges have very stiff penalties if you have >10:1 ratio of orders:fills - and spoofing there is almost nonexistent.
But SEC behaviour indicates that they have no intention of fixing that aspect of the market.
> It's like passing laws making web-scraping for email addresses into hacking. It feels like it'll make us safer, but because "only criminals have guns" it just ends up shooting a few people in the foot and weakening us overall against actual threats.
No, it's not. Exchanges are few and (supposedly) extremely well regulated. The number of "bad actors" (spoofers or otherwise) is also small and under strict regulation.
Your claim that it is is nonsensical. An equivalent claim is "It's like making shooting people in the streets a crime. It feels like it'll make us safer, because only criminals will shoot people but it ends up weakening us overall against actual threats". We have made that a crime, we've done what's needed to enforce those laws, and it has made us stronger, not weaker.
Almost everything you said is directly refuted in the article, or by some simple reasoning. Exchanges are not well regulated, as this happened for years, and they appear to have come down on the smallest offender. This is feel-good enforcement, and in no way comes with even an attempted guarantee that the behavior has been stopped. You're free to assume it has, but that's a probably niche view among people investing with their own money.
> Additionally, at present the SEC is a part of the spoofing arms race, and is massively (and some say willingly due to regulatory capture) underfunded and incompetent in that race with no intent to win.
Impossible mandates have a way of sapping your will.
> You want to legislate it so that it has teeth?
No, giving a bad law bigger teeth seems like a poor idea.
I want to examine the root cause of the issue and fix that once and for all.
The issue appears to be that someone decided that you should be able to trust my signals, "because trust, mkay". So inherently we've got a situation like poker where I benefit if you misread me, and we've got a re-active nanny trying to make me play nicely...
If instead we said to you "his buy/sell orders aren't an appropriate signal for you to base things on because they're easy to misread", we'd be done.
Then if you wanted a system where people didn't game it like this you could do what I proposed earlier and simply make each order cost a small amount if cancelled early or whatever. You'd know precisely how much (the early-cancellation fee) you could trust my signals. And then if enough people agreed, they'd start only accepting bids that had a deposit and you'd have your way, unlike now where you only think you do.
> An equivalent claim is "It's like making shooting people in the streets a crime [...]
Wow, no. Equivalency fail. Hitler much?
But though, if you trust in a prohibition on murder to keep you safe and refuse to defend yourself, perhaps there is some small amount of similarity...
I think the original commenter's point was that if you take for granted that people will act ethically with no ulterior motives, you lose a healthy skepticism that is very beneficial to a market.
Murder isn't an economic action bordering on indistinguishable from normal interactions. Publishing some bids you don't really want accepted is.
If "spoofing" was really only outlawed in the Dodd Frank act then it seems likely that most countries wouldn't have any laws against it, and an extradition would fail on the grounds that what Sarao is accused of would not be a crime in his country of origin.
I'm sure the UK Government will love the idea of sending a trader to the dogs in America regardless of whether or not this is actually illegal in the UK itself, just because it's election time and like all politicos everywhere they want to be seen as whacking financial types. But it seems to lead to a bad precedent. If trading strategies can be simply made illegal in a law so large even the people who voted on it didn't read it, then how can anyone really know if their trades are illegal or not?