As for working scientists, many have brilliant insights into the practice of science and its epistemology, but very many working scientists will offer you a warmed over version of Karl Popper as their philosophy of science.
I perhaps should have worded my post differently to clarify that my post is a criticism of philosophers (academics specializing in philosophy), not philosophy as it is more broadly practiced.
> Right now, a constant conflict is that (many) non-philosophers of science think philosophy of science has gotten too empirical and too focused on particular scientific issues, to the detriment of philosophy
I know, and that's exactly why I'm disagreeing with these people. As far as I'm concerned, philosophy that hasn't specialized in this way is mostly useless.
When you say you're not criticizing philosophy, just academic philosophers, I wonder who are the people doing philosophy outside of academic philosophy that you're talking about?
This works poorly because the philosopher doesn't understand the field. A computer scientist is better qualified to talk about the ethics of Ladar Levison not cooperating with the FBI[1] than an ethicist. A chemist is more qualified to talk about the scientific method than an epistemologist. Specializations have eroded the area of expertise of philosophy to the point that philosophy is rarely relevant.
There's just no case I can think of where talking to a philosopher is likely to inform my decision-making process more than talking to an expert in the actual subject.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit