Re:Raven paradox
by kazinator on Sunday April 05, 2015 @10:27AM
(#9324100)
The reason that a paradox is perceived is that evidence-based inductive reasoning is dressed up in logical language.
A logical proposition like "forall(x) : is_raven(x) -> black(x)" is not something that is justified by evidence. It is a statement of logic, which requires a proof.
Just because you've examined a hundred million ravens, and they have all been black, doesn't mean you have reason to believe that the proposition is true. A single counterexample destroys it. That is the case even if the counterexample happens to be the last instance which is examined, of the entire set of ravens in existence.
A counterexample is some X which satisfies is_raven(x), but fails black(x).
It is not the case that any other X is evidence; any other X just fails to be a counterexample. A non-counterexample to a universal claim is not evidence that it is true; evidence is simply not an applicable concept and misleading. If you accept a logical statement on evidence, you're committing a logical fallacy.
Now if we want to study the color of ravens empirically, then we must throw away the logical proposition. Our goal cannot be to prove that all ravens are black. Rather, something else, like "based on our random sampling method, we are 95% confident that between 99.996 and 99.998 percent of all ravens are black".
If we strip away the misleading instances of over-reaching logical language from an empirical investigation, then the paradox goes away.
A logical proposition like "forall(x) : is_raven(x) -> black(x)" is not something that is justified by evidence. It is a statement of logic, which requires a proof.
Just because you've examined a hundred million ravens, and they have all been black, doesn't mean you have reason to believe that the proposition is true. A single counterexample destroys it. That is the case even if the counterexample happens to be the last instance which is examined, of the entire set of ravens in existence.
A counterexample is some X which satisfies is_raven(x), but fails black(x).
It is not the case that any other X is evidence; any other X just fails to be a counterexample. A non-counterexample to a universal claim is not evidence that it is true; evidence is simply not an applicable concept and misleading. If you accept a logical statement on evidence, you're committing a logical fallacy.
Now if we want to study the color of ravens empirically, then we must throw away the logical proposition. Our goal cannot be to prove that all ravens are black. Rather, something else, like "based on our random sampling method, we are 95% confident that between 99.996 and 99.998 percent of all ravens are black".
If we strip away the misleading instances of over-reaching logical language from an empirical investigation, then the paradox goes away.