News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Truecrypt report by Karunamon on Thursday April 02, 2015 @04:54PM (#9313142)
Possibly contrived example: An airgapped Windows machine. We've eliminated the possibility of any data exfiltration (all the software vulnerabilities in the world can't transmit on a downed interface), but that does not mean that the encryption itself is not defeated in some way by the existence of a "master key" or some other flaw that allows an attacker to access the data offline.

Truecrypt has now been proven to have no such flaws.

It's unlikely that Bitlocker will ever be proven in the same way.

Anyone that has a legitimate fear of that kind of attack, the bad guys with guns coming in and seizing your stuff, would use Truecrypt over Bitlocker out of an abundance of caution.

Re:Truecrypt report by tptacek on Thursday April 02, 2015 @04:55PM (#9313148)
Why exactly is it hard for reverse engineers to discover how Bitlocker is keyed? If it's because it colludes with compromised hardware, why isn't that just as problematic for Truecrypt?
Re:Truecrypt report by Karunamon on Thursday April 02, 2015 @05:01PM (#9313183)
It isn't necessarily - but there's a lot of places to hide in a large set of binary blobs. Can any effort spent reverse engineering any program (let alone an operating system!) compete with a line-by-line audit of the source of a single program?

Compromised hardware is another matter entirely. The old rule is, "if an attacker has physical access to your machine, it's not your machine anymore", and it's no less true here.

Re:Truecrypt report by tptacek on Thursday April 02, 2015 @05:03PM (#9313200)
It's funny you should mention it, because the Windows kernel is among the more comprehensively reverse-engineered codebases in the industry.