NSA can virtually certainly target a specific, hardcoded 1024 bit key and break it. In fact, leaving out the cost and difficulty of recruiting the team to actually put the pieces together, the typical California venture capital firm has the resources to build a machine to do that today. Eran Tromer put the cost of such a machine in the single-digit millions, many years ago.
Apropos nothing: the gap between a 1024 bit key and a 2048 bit key is enormous. The thing that allows the NSA to meaningfully attack a 2048 bit key is likely to take RSA out altogether (and with it probably multiplicative finite field --- ie, "conventional" --- Diffie Hellman).
Also, there's the possibility that even if a product uses a 2048 bit RSA key it might have been weakened.
"As of 2010, the largest factored RSA number was 768 bits long"
I read this as "today, 1024 bit factorizations are possible"
tptacek said it's extraordinarily unlikely NSA can scalably factor RSA-1024 today [1].
Look at how difficulty increases in the Yafu with GGNFS benchmark on wikipedia [2].
1 - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8844239
2 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28cryptosystem%29#Integer...