Re:Security of Infrastructure Secrets
by jessaustin on Friday March 27, 2015 @09:06AM
(#9275969)
Well, sure, but that's inherent in the "perimeter" concept referenced above. The design assumes there is an advantage to relaxing the hardening requirements of hosts connected only to the subnet. These could include: only having to keep ssh whitelists current on the bastion, instead of on all hosts. Being able to completely reorganize reverse proxies without having to update all the app servers. In general, it can be valuable for any particular host to trust that any particular incoming connection is not related to a DDOS. If a host connects to the public internet, that's not possible.
Re:Security of Infrastructure Secrets
by fweespeech on Monday March 30, 2015 @12:35PM
(#9290663)
Well, if its a pure bastion, the only services to compromise is SSH and the package management [e.g. apt].
If either of those get compromised, you are hosed anyway.
I really really hope that bastion host never gets compromised.