Here's a not-at-all real-world example – say an attacker causes a cryptographic operation to happen, while at the same time monitoring the time taken to respond to a ping request. Ignoring loads of complexity, we might find that a machine takes slightly longer to respond to a ping when it is performing an operation (i.e. the CPU is busy) than when it is sleeping. If that's the case, we're suddenly leaking timing information again.
It's really hard for me to buy that an attacker can determine the execution characteristics of your crypographic functions via ping over the internet.
I understand your scepticism, but there have been a fair few timing attacks showing the viability of this approach.
I don't understand why purposefully having everything related to cryptography taking a predetermined time doesn't solve it. That's where my skepticism occurs.
I've had people mention OS page faults, ping requests, and DDOS concerns and I don't buy any of it. if the timing is really so tight that a page fault can throw you off, there's no way an outside attacker could possibly glean anything useful from the timing. The timings by definition have to be varying more than that.
I don't buy the DDOS because cryptographic functions are designed to be slow, we're not trying to make them slower, we're trying to make them even between requests. Choose a reasonable delta and anything that blows that delta starts over with another delta instead of just returning.
I don't understand why that wouldn't solve the problem reasonably. At this point I feel like it's an academic exercise rather than a practical one.
I'll openly admit a lot of these points become moot if the attacker has access to the machine itself where something like latency cannot dwarf the timings of the functions themselves (when they're specifically made to wait for a delta).
how?