Re:X86 is a high-level language
by saidajigumi on Wednesday March 25, 2015 @01:54PM
(#9264633)
This is only if the channel is a purely-external measurement of the computation, e.g. total turnaround time time to a result. A sleep won't do anything to mask a side-channel which involves (sometimes obscure) access to the actual work being done by the processor.
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Up-voting the parent.
There are attacks such as FLUSH-RELOAD which are today difficult to avoid on modern hardware and allow this sort of introspection into the CPU instructions and their timings.
Of course, there are a whole range of active and valid side-channels that are readily exploitable today. These are no longer NOBUS vulnerabilities, but are increasingly within the range and scope of ordinary attackers.
Re:X86 is a high-level language
by saidajigumi on Wednesday March 25, 2015 @04:14PM
(#9265616)
And relevant to the post re: sleep, there are things like Cross-VM side channels[1], an important consideration given how much infrastructure runs in shared environments these days.
Interestingly, the authors of the CCS paper are Yinqian Zhang and Michael K. Reiter. More recently, they've been publishing papers which deepen our understanding of the FLUSH+RELOAD side-channel as I described in my post (F+R was originally discovered by Yuval Yarom).