One does not simply pare down regulation. There's a reason it grew in the first place - even if it's nothing more than bureaucrats giving themselves a reason to get a paycheck. You have to strike at the root cause of the regulation, otherwise you'll get pushback or it'll come back if you don't constantly expend effort on it.

I may be mistaken, but I get the feeling that you feel the root causes of overregulation are overzealous regulators abd legislation. However, the >root< root causes of regulation are the need to minimize the tragedy of the commons, and the sale of the market.

How are these supposed to be handled, without socially enforced conduct agreements, enforced by an overarching party?

No libertarian has ever explained this to me without hand waving and appeals to doctrine.

The point I was trying to make was that there's a reason why regulation exists. Sometimes it's a good reason - solving coordination problems. Sometimes it's a bad reason - giving your buddy a paycheck. Regardless of what the reason is, it's more effective to find and kill the root than to hack away at the branches. I was trying to get at a more general point than "Don't repeal regulations, fire regulators." I was really hoping to point at part of the problem-solving philosophy that generates the "attack the root cause" instinct I've been cultivating.

I apologize for not explaining my point well the first time. I hope this is more clear. I'm not a libertarian, and didn't intend to write something that looks like pro-libertarian propaganda.

No apology needed! Sorry if I came off as implying you were the L-word :)

> How are these supposed to be handled, without socially enforced conduct agreements, enforced by an overarching party?

With contract enforced conduct agreements, enforced by a dispute-resolution organization, who tracks your reputation upon which people and other courts will decide whether to enter contracts with you.

No libertarian has ever explained that to you? Robert Nozick explained that to me.

In other words, enforced by an overarching party, regardless how you imagine the enforcement taking place.

And there are many situations where a collective 'reputation' system isn't an appropriate tool - such as when a party has the resources for self-sufficiency (or simply considers the reputation drop 'worth' it), or no contract is being undertaken in the first place. You essentially ignored the tragedy of the commons. >And< the sale of the market.

I want to thank you for your response, but with all due respect, this sounds like exactly the dogmatic handwaving I was referring to. Perhaps things aren't being explained to me in a way I am able to understand? Aside from the fact that a governing body is a government, exactly how does a reputation system prevent the tragedy of the commons? How does it prevent the sale of the market - ie - it's own co-option?

Again, with all due respect, I can't help feeling that libertarianism is inherently short-sighted and hypocritical political view, driven more by cognitive dissonance and the effect of desire on perception inherent to human psychology. I very open to being disabused of this perception, if someone can address the two issues I have brought up.

You simply can't have, and also not have, a government, no matter how enforcement is performed.

I'd love to chat with you at more length if you're interested.

I'm not sure I understand your two objections as I can't see an example of how the free market with its reliance on private property fails to address the tragedy of the commons.

Why does this stuff sound myopic and hypocritical to you? And where is the cognitive dissonance? If you could exemplify I'd appreciate it as I'm curious to understand your point of view now.

I can tell you I see a lot more cognitive dissonance in Yellen's saying that she will raise interest rates but never doing it, than I see in Praxeology's acceptance that incentives steer human motivation.