If you want to prevent MITM attacks, it's one of the only options available to you (probably the only realistic option):
https://github.com/okTurtles/dnschain/blob/master/docs/Compa...
> However, we can reduce the scope of the problem, and just focus on forcing certificates to be public. [1]
DNSChain/Blockchains already provide certificate transparency (publicly auditable log of certs issued), and they do a far better job of it than Certificate Transparency.
Better in what way?
No, it doesn't. It describes the format of multi-SCT on page 16, and it explains the rationale for this (basically all of the points you brought up) on page 32.
I see the wording wasn't very clear, so I removed the word "only" to make the meaning clearer. It now reads:
"The CT spec allows one SCT to accompany a certificate, making this attack feasible"
Good catch. :)
However, we can reduce the scope of the problem, and just focus on forcing certificates to be public. [1]
If we went a bit further, and required that the certs be in the public log for some minimum amount of time (say 6 hours), that would have made it possible to shut down MCS before they got started.
[1] http://www.certificate-transparency.org/