A memory safe language alone isn't enough. Look at Java. Isn't that supposed to be a memory safe language? And yet it's constantly got security issues.
Not to say that Java is going to eliminate all bugs. However, it should eliminate all bugs to do with, e.g., reading/writing out of the bounds of an array and resulting in RCE due to bugs introduced in the application code. Reading/writing out of the bounds of an array will still be a bug, but not one that allows arbitrary code execution (at least not in the same way as it may for a language like C.
In fact, one of the first real security holes I've ever found was in 1.0 version of the CLR. You could load a function pointer to an un-JIT'd function, then later on use that to safely jump to other code. This is technically a RCE, but the user has to be executing your code first anyways. That is, if the CLR and Java didn't set out to run "partially trusted" code with no help from the OS, these wouldn't have been problems at all.
Other languages like C, Ruby, etc. simply don't have this "partially trusted" concept so there's nothing to attack. (Well I guess things like Native Client or VMware qualify, but they're at a better abstraction later than JVM or CLR permissions.)
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/People/egs/kimera/flaws/vacuum/
But most security holes these days are not flaws in the JVM/CLR, but logical errors made in the application; e.g. allocate a buffer and reuse it, this says nothing about memory safety at the VM level at all!
And at that, no one really trusts JVM security anymore, preferring to sandbox the entire operating environment in a heavyweight or lightweight VM.
But most applications are written in memory-safe languages, so it's not surprising that most vulnerabilities are found in non-memory-safety related areas. The more interesting statistic is the number of critical security bugs that are memory-safety related in non-memory-safe languages.
But app level bugs aren't what gives Java a bad name, are they? When someone says, like the GP, that "what about Java, that's got tons of security issues", that's almost certainly from its use as a browser plugin. Otherwise everyone would be saying the same about every language out there.
Ya, when people say Java is insecure, they usually mean the Java plugin has insecure interfaces. As the browser + Java becomes increasingly rare, it fades from our memory. There is nothing insecure or secure about the language, memory safety actually works...but its only one small part in having a secure environment.
I worry about Rust, it pushes the safety card much more aggressively, but in reality without full on aggressive dependent typing, they'll only be able to guarantee a few basic properties. The language won't magically make your code "secure", just a bit easier to secure.
Our analysis of the security benefit of Rust comes from two very simple, empirical facts:
1. Apps written in memory-safe languages do not have nearly the same numbers of memory safety bugs (use after free, heap overflow, etc.) as apps written in C and C++ do.
2. Memory safety issues make up the largest number of critical RCE bugs in browser engines.
> The language won't magically make your code "secure", just a bit easier to secure.
Of course it won't magically make your code secure. Applications written in Rust will have security vulnerabilities, some of them critical. But I'm at a loss as to how you can claim that getting rid of all the use-after-free bugs (just to name one class) inside a multi-million-line browser engine in a language with manual memory management is easy. Nobody has ever succeeded at it, despite over a decade of sustained engineering effort on multiple browser engines.
I didn't claim it was "easy", just that bugs would still exist and the browser's "securedness" would only increase marginally. The problem is not that this isn't an achievement, only in managing expectations (e.g. saying Rust is secure which doesn't make sense).
> Nobody has ever succeeded at it, despite over a decade of sustained engineering effort on multiple browser engines.
It is a nice goal, but the question is where is the world afterwards? Will Firefox all of a sudden become substantially more secure and robust vs. its competition, to the extent that it can out compete them and increase its market share significantly?
My brief experience at Coverity makes me guess that you could be getting rid of one class of bugs without necessarily improving the product in any noticeable way...that ya, those bugs were common but not particularly easy to exploit or hard to fix once found.
Not that the effort isn't worthy at all. I'm just a bit cynical when it comes to seeing the tangible benefits.
I disagree with the latter. Based on our analysis, Rust provides a defense against the majority of critical security bugs in Gecko.
> It is a nice goal, but the question is where is the world afterwards? Will Firefox all of a sudden become substantially more secure and robust vs. its competition, to the extent that it can out compete them and increase its market share significantly?
You've changed the question from "will this increase security" to "is improved security going to result in users choosing Firefox en masse". The latter question is a business question, not a technical question, and not one relevant to Rust or this thread. At the limit, it's asking "why should engineering resources be spent improving the product".
Rust is a tool to defend against memory safety vulnerabilities. It's also a tool to make systems programming more accessible to programmers who aren't long-time C++ experts and to make concurrent and parallel programming in large-scale systems more robust. The combination of those things makes it a significant advance over what we had to work with before, in my mind.
> My brief experience at Coverity makes me guess that you could be getting rid of one class of bugs without necessarily improving the product in any noticeable way...that ya, those bugs were common but not particularly easy to exploit or hard to fix once found.
It is true that exploitation of UAF (for example) is not within the skill level of most programmers and that individual UAFs are easy to fix. But "hard for most programmers to exploit and easy to fix" doesn't seem to be much of a mitigation. For example, the Rails YAML vulnerability was also hard to exploit (requiring knowledge of Ruby serialization internals and vulnerable standard library constructors) and easy to fix (just disable YAML), but it was rightly considered a fire-drill operation across Web sites the world over. The "smart cow" phenomenon ensures that vulnerabilities that start out difficult to exploit become easy to exploit when packaged up into scripts, if the incentives are there to do so. Exploitable use-after-free vulnerabilities in network-facing apps are like the Rails YAML vulnerabilities: "game-over" RCEs (possibly when combined with sandbox escapes).
The developers' claim is that more than half of all security bugs are bugs due to memory safety issues and that Rust will solve these. More than halving the number of bugs doesn't sound marginal to me.
In other words, if we magically went back in time and wrote all MS products in Rust instead of C++, their CVE could for RCEs, their famous worms, etc. would all disappear (except in the cases where they explicitly opted into unsafe features.)
Back in the 90s and early 00s, a lot of the low fruit was buffer overflows or forged pointers. Then we got serious about fuzz testing and static analysis, and now they are picking at other fruit (which is why Heartbleed was so weird).
I'd love to see Rust shown too.
The other Java bugs are ones that'd plague any language: SQL injection, rules-engines-gone-wild, etc.
Web sandboxes are full of holes too. That's why modern browsers have sandboxes within sandboxes. I don't think an HTML5 sandbox is less complicated than the JVM sandbox.
Sure. Nobody is claiming (or should claim) that memory safety is a solution to all security problems. That's independent of the claim that memory safety is an effective defense against common vulnerabilities in C and C++ programs.
Unspecified vulnerability in Oracle Java SE 6u85, 7u72,
and 8u25 allows local users to affect confidentiality,
integrity, and availability via unknown vectors related
to Deployment.Has it? I can't remember the last time I saw a security advisory for Tomcat or Jetty (there are some but they're rare), in stark contrast to Apache or Nginx.
No; you have D for that.
EDIT: Seriously, for the grumpy down voter: I've seen quite a few programmers write that they use D even for things that are normally considered as scripting tasks.
Security is all or nothing. You can't have a little bit of this and a little bit of that. Unless the parts of the web browser that can be "influenced" by external attacker (directly or indirectly) are written 100% in a memory safe language, you simply have no real security but the illusion of such.
And this is how that hypothetical browser fails, and why it will never amount to anything re: security, since it's gonna end up using a gazillion of C libraries, all of them full of bugs and possibly vulnerable to security exploits.
One could say that Rust also fails by allowing "unsafe" code in its core design but it's still too early to see how that will play out.
As an example, I would happily claim that nginx is more secure than wordpress or the average php website written with mysql_query in the 90s. Does nginx have bugs? Probably somewhere in there. Are they as likely to be found, exploited, or (when exploited) lead to as serious issues? I doubt it.
Security is often about many many levels. A good example of this is Chrome, its sandboxing, operating system memory randomization, and user privileges. When someone finds a bug in v8, to turn it into root on the box requires bugs in all those layers (see writeups for pwn2own).
Generally, an improvement in security at any layer will reduce the impact of bugs at other layers. I'd absolutely rather have a browser written 20% in rust than 0% in rust.
It takes more thought to write Rust programs. If you want to write safer widely-deployed infrastructure, you should learn about it. It may not be your best option right now, but its ideals are those that we absolutely need to strive for. Acting macho about C and the ability to write it safely does not lead to fewer RCE's in the world. It leads to more, because newcomers may see such people who can do so as examples to be emulated, far before they are capable.
Note that there are no familiar critics who say that Rust will not prevent some bugs. Note that there are no familiar proponents who claim that Rust will prevent all bugs. It is an implementation that strives to make progress in an area that we can all agree with - the safety of our programs with minimal performance degradation.