Why can't OpenSSL have an simple early warning list like most other major software packages. It's only adding one CC field.
He just complains that they don't give him access, when in fact they offered him access.
> Theo meant he has no time to join yet another mailing list where OpenSSL security issues are very likely way less an 1% of the messages.
Is it really that hard to filter for /openssl/i/?
Nevertheless, it should be doable for OpenSSL to also mail LibreSSL; it is a bit of a special case, after all.
The amount of mails sounds like a strange argument to me. I can't imagine that they couldn't find one of the regular consumers of the mailing list willing to pass relevant ones on, assuming it were clear that LibreSSL is an accepted recipient of the information.
That said, I don't expect much in the way of goodwill or willingness to compromise on any side here.
Indeed, this is the main point, OpenBSD developers are proponents of full-disclosure:
http://www.openbsd.org/security.html
This paragraph summarizes it very well:
Security information moves very fast in cracker circles. On the other hand, our experience is that coding and releasing of proper security fixes typically requires about an hour of work -- very fast fix turnaround is possible. Thus we think that full disclosure helps the people who really care about security.
No, you're thinking of linux-distros@. linux-distros@ is where issues that affect Linux only go. distros@ covers issues that are relevant to both BSD and Linux - distros@ membership is FreeBSD+NetBSD+linux-distros@.
This mailing list conversation sounds like a cartoon bureaucrat saying "Well, I'd LOVE to help you, but you didn't tick checkbox 16-A on your X-23 form last week."
My employer repackages Ubuntu into a virtual appliance, but since we're firmly downstream and haven't yet had the time to get deeply involved in upstream security work, we're not allowed on the distros list. (We haven't asked, but the policy is pretty clear.) I think that's pretty fair, even if I personally dislike that end result.
See for instance, the disastrous handling around Shellshock, where no details were given on the distros list, the announcement went public, and it took a few days (in public) for people, mostly people on distros@, to realize that the patch was incomplete and two more patches were needed. It's not clear the distros list worked any better than a public announcement would have.
The other argument is that embargoes always get harder to enforce as you add more people to them. The distros list is the successor of the old vendor-sec list, which was more lenient about membership and always had suspicions of leaks (until someone broke into the mail server....). See, for instance, the messy handling of Heartbleed's embargo:
http://www.theage.com.au/it-pro/security-it/heartbleed-discl...
I think that if there's going to be a private disclosure process at all, it's better that it's bureaucratic instead of friends telling their friends at CloudFlare and Akamai, under the table, that they should patch.
It's not the whole story. Here's the whole story:
http://lwn.net/Articles/601958/
"As it turns out, de Raadt had been asked if he wanted to join the distros list back in early May."
"[de Raadt:] So I'll decline."