Most models assume financial markets are a continuous function, when in reality markets are mostly continuous with periodic step functions. When you hit a period with a step function, the market is either being irrational or correcting prior irrationality. You can't predict these step functions with any accuracy; though many of the big investment banks knew it was coming a year or two in advance. But even if you can predict them, there is no good way to model them.
Goldman Sachs, for all its faults, is run by exceptionally competent people. They came out of the downturn stronger than they went in. They understand the models well because they built most of them. But there were plenty of large market players at Lehman, Merrill, Nationwide, etc. who were ignorant of the problems until it was too late. These are the people who just did what the model told them to because it was making them money, and they didn't understand the risk exposure they really had.
Do you think all these guys with fancy degrees did not think about this? Come on, of course they did. You don't even need to know about any model in particular to understand that models rest on assumptions. It's a high school concept they teach you in any TOK class.
The reason GS was able to react is IMO they have a great network. The culture is geared towards finding out what other people are thinking. They're the only firm I've been out to dinner with where the guys cared to hear my opinion, in depth. The same salesguy at another shop reverted back to type.
So they found out through their feedback that many, many people did not think the models were correct and acted on it.
The problem was that models assumed some risks were uncorrelated and in 2008 they became highly correlated.
A lot of major wall street institutions got destroyed by it.
2008 was not the first time correlation shot to 1. Sure, it's hard to model, I'll admit that. But to think that nobody had considered this is wrong.
I saw a bunch of people who knew the models were wrong, but nobody had the balls to say so while the spreadsheets still worked.
I don't think this is true. Plenty of smart people who worked with various models knew their data wasn't solid and reflected just a few years of a benign market, and plenty of people understood the rather obvious idea of a Black Swan.
The reason they kept at it was systemic: they were paid to sit and cheer the market up, continue to sell product, and generally not question the business model.
The people who made a lot of money off the crash tended to be people who were able to sit out the upswing in some way, without being punished too hard. Hedge fund managers with either new funds or long track records, like Paulson and Andrew Lahde.
The crash was always coming. I remember going to a luncheon at GS where that was the major point. This was in 2006, and they predicted it would start in 2007 and culminate in 2008.