Re:Rooting Out Malware with a Side-Channel Chip Defense System
by warkdarrior on Friday February 27, 2015 @05:09PM
(#9121682)
Indeed, the very next paragraph lists limitations:
"Computers with users regularly attached to them, like laptops and smartphones, often have no baseline routine from which abnormal behavior can be inferred. [emphasis mine!] So, PFP officials say, their technology is at the moment better suited to things like routers, networks, power grids, critical infrastructure, and other more automated systems."
Re:Rooting Out Malware with a Side-Channel Chip Defense System
by SixSigma on Friday February 27, 2015 @06:26PM
(#9122025)
Shame you didn't carry on. All the interesting stuff was after that paragraph.
Re:Rooting Out Malware with a Side-Channel Chip Defense System
by azernik on Saturday February 28, 2015 @04:40AM
(#9123289)
I've found that if someone's comment says "I stopped reading at X", the comment is more likely to respond to an unintentionally-constructed strawman than to the actual article content.
I stopped right there because I smell assumptions that any number of things might violate: background tasks, VMs, VPN software, background P2P networking software (e.g. belonging to a Kad network), auto-updaters, debuggers, system profilers, management software for IT asset control, etc.
That and malware authors would immediately set about working to make their power profiles more typical. What they've found is that current malware produced with no attention to obfuscating this aspect often looks different from current typical application code.
Can't see this being robust at all. Sounds like a whole pile of false positives too. I suppose something like this could be used as part of an array of detection methods deployed to devices to help monitor for suspicious changes in baseline activity that could then be investigated.