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Re:GPG and Me by lmm on Wednesday February 25, 2015 @08:54AM (#9106707)
The CA system sucks but what would you replace it with? The only remotely viable alternative candidate is the OpenPGP web of trust, and, well, see the article.

Transport is the wrong layer to do encryption (much as I'd love to see more adoption of IPSec) because encryption and authentication are inextricably linked. Suppose you can confirm that you're absolutely, veritably talking to 174.16.23.46, and your messages can't be read by anyone but them. What good does that actually do you?

TLS is, despite all the problematic cipher suites, fundamentally sound infrastructure - which is why it hasn't been replaced. The same is true of OpenPGP. We don't need new protocols, just better implementations - an equivalent of LibreSSL for OpenPGP.

Re:GPG and Me by timboslice on Wednesday February 25, 2015 @09:48AM (#9106930)
> Suppose you can confirm that you're absolutely, veritably talking to 174.16.23.46, and your messages can't be read by anyone but them. What good does that actually do you?

In the current post Snowden climate, can't we agree that this is at least a good thing? The good it does at the most basic level is protect your communications from prying eyes.

Re:GPG and Me by lmm on Wednesday February 25, 2015 @10:01AM (#9106998)
Does it though? There's no point encrypting everything twice at two different layers. And if you use an unauthenticated protocol running over IPSec, you can have a dangerously false sense of security.