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Re:GPG and Me by lmm on Wednesday February 25, 2015 @07:30AM (#9106392)
Perfect forward secrecy is of course better than not, but I'm not convinced it actually helps a lot for realistic threat models. It means that when you utterly screw up and reveal today's treason you won't also be revealing last week's treason - but for someone who's using crypto for serious reasons, how often is it that last week's message would get you in trouble and today's message is innocuous?

Would a ground-up rewrite of OpenPGP have PFS? Of course. Is the functionality important enough to justify a new protocol? Not on its own, IMO.

Re:GPG and Me by lmm on Wednesday February 25, 2015 @12:27PM (#9108031)
Follow-up: on more thinking, I don't think it's possible at all without compromising important properties of GPG.