This is also very similar to the tactic of using an encrypted message digest in place of a MAC. The whole point of a MAC is that it can't be calculated without the secret that provides its security, and so schemes that use digests instead are (a) harder to attack than systems that do nothing and (b) still broken.
1. They have storage flexibility, so they can allocate metadata to authenticators and nonces. The fact that sector-level crypto can't do this means that the "state of the art" in efficient sector crypto is essentially unauthenticated ECB mode.
2. They're message-aware, so they can apply authentication at meaningful boundaries; a block crypto device is essentially a simulated hard disk, and so it doesn't know where files begin and end.
3. Being message-aware, they can protect files at a better level of granularity than "all or nothing", which for instance is the security failure that made it so easy for the FBI to convict Ross Ulbricht for Silk Road.
A lot of concerns about filesystem crypto stem from the fact that filesystem crypto precedes sector-level crypto, and most of it was designed (or has designs tracing to) the 1990s. What people who don't spend a lot of time studying crypto should remember is that nobody knew how to encrypt anything in the 1990s. It was a unique and weird time, where there was a lot of demand and interest in crypto, but not enough knowledge to supply crypto effectively.
So we should be careful about judging filesystem crypto by the standards of the 1990s.
Out of interest: Doesn't the use of error detecting filesystems like ZFS and Btrfs solve the authentication problem? I don't have anything resembling a formal argument, but intuitively having each block checked in a Merkle tree like fashion should inhibit attacks where attackers can only change blocks in a random manner or restore old backups of the blocks. Of course time traveling - i.e. replaying - the file system as whole is still possible, but selectively manipulating the data should not.