Re:Japan's Oldest Businesses Have Survived for More Than 1,0...
by stephenhuey on Friday February 13, 2015 @01:16AM
(#9043156)
Freakonomics covered this in a podcast in 2011. They looked at how businesses all over the world in which the founder passed the helm on to a child tended to perform worse EXCEPT in the case of Japan. The reason is because Japanese firms often search for a strong performer to become the next CEO and then the current CEO formally adopts that person into the family.
That paper's title is Adoptive Expectations:
Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms, and the transcript is as follows:
A unique Japanese practice of adopting adults, even if one has biological children, makes Japanese
family firms unusually economically competitive. Using a large panel that very nearly comprises the
population of postwar listed nonfinancial firms; we find inherited family firms more important in
postwar Japan than generally realized, and also performing well – an unusual finding for a developed
economy. Adopted heirs’ firms outperform blood heirs’ firms, and match or nearly match founderrun
listed firms. Both adopted and blood heirs’ firms outperform nonfamily firms (excluding founders’
firms). With blood heir gender and educational records as instruments, we find family succession
events “causing” elevated performance. These findings are consistent with adult adoptees displacing
blood heirs in the left tail of the talent distribution, with the “adopted son” job motivating star
managers, and with the threat of displacement inducing blood heirs to invest in human capital,
mitigating the socalled “Carnegie conjecture” that inherited wealth deadens talent.
Audio podcast: http://freakonomics.com/2011/08/03/new-freakonomics-radio-po...
Transcript of the podcast: http://freakonomics.com/2011/06/03/the-church-of-scionology-...
One of the papers cited by Freakonomics is here: http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/areas/finance/activiti...
That paper's title is Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms, and the transcript is as follows:
A unique Japanese practice of adopting adults, even if one has biological children, makes Japanese family firms unusually economically competitive. Using a large panel that very nearly comprises the population of postwar listed nonfinancial firms; we find inherited family firms more important in postwar Japan than generally realized, and also performing well – an unusual finding for a developed economy. Adopted heirs’ firms outperform blood heirs’ firms, and match or nearly match founderrun listed firms. Both adopted and blood heirs’ firms outperform nonfamily firms (excluding founders’ firms). With blood heir gender and educational records as instruments, we find family succession events “causing” elevated performance. These findings are consistent with adult adoptees displacing blood heirs in the left tail of the talent distribution, with the “adopted son” job motivating star managers, and with the threat of displacement inducing blood heirs to invest in human capital, mitigating the socalled “Carnegie conjecture” that inherited wealth deadens talent.