Even this case is mitigated because of the timestamping: a compromise would have to be a public compromise on an ongoing basis, and everyone in the world would have to see the same compromise, including the alleged twitter holder. Tracker statements add to the timestamping: when someone runs the Keybase client and tracks them, they sign a statement saying on date X twitter user Y had that public key and they checked it.
The second advantage is that a person is typically a sum of many identities. Consider a known developer who signs code using their Keybase announced key. (Let's say Jeremy Ashkenas does (does he?) - anyway, he's on Keybase as https://keybase.io/jashkenas). His public key is announced on his Github and Twitter accounts, both of which are known. He signs those statements with the matching private key. If you ask Keybase for his key, you get 3 things: Keybase telling you what it is, Twitter agreeing with you, Github agreeing with you, and bitcoin telling you everyone in the world has gotten the same answer for those 3 accounts for the last few months. And CLI tracker statements timestamping, too.
Additionally, doesn't the user signing the statement with his or her private key mean that you need to have his private key to really believe it? I notice on the website it states that encryption/decryption is done with client encrypted keys. If it's client encrypted presumably the signing is happening at the client and an announcement is sent to keybase stating as such. How can you trust the data your getting back from the client is trustworthy or not also compromised?
Forgive me if I'm being boneheaded here, I'm just trying to grasp this so I can say, "Yes, that makes enough sense."
How does HN feel about that identity aspect? Is it supposed to replaced key signing or just augment it?
I'm frankly not sure I fully get my head around the concept, even after reading this page:
https://keybase.io/docs/tracking
But it's Friday afternoon, so that could be it...