In support of that: http://www.xbitlabs.com/images/news/2009-11/amd_bulldozer_sc...
However, the end result of both CPU design and the microcode team is essentially unreadable.
No-one outside Intel can read their microcode updates, as they are obfuscated in some way, possibly encrypted. This means that compromising just the last step, the people or tools doing the obfuscating, means you can output whatever you want with no-one on the team being able to find it out.
The same is true for the CPU design. Created masks are generally not looked at, other than to verify small spots if it seems there are bugs. Because of this, compromising the last step between the model and the mask would allow you to output whatever you want with no-one of the thousands of the people working on it ever finding out.
I notice that despite the thousands who have worked for Intel, virtually no Intel confidential material has been leaked. At least, that I'm aware of.
People value their careers and houses, and I'm sure Intel threatens employees with consequences for leaking.
I don't think that has been true for a very long time.
If the backdoor depends on some "magic values", it would be relatively easy to spot just by looking at the microcode.
The problem with both your theory and the article's theory is that nobody outside the chip companies themselves really knows how the microcode works. This reduces both the people who could pull off such a backdoor and the people who could discover it to a very small number.
A similar thing applies to your point about changes during manufacturing.
Overall, this means that CPU backdoors are a thing to be concerned about, keeping in mind that it's probably a technique that will, for a long time, be limited to the kind of people who were responsible for Stuxnet.