Generally, anything with a microcontroller that might run firmware (BIOS or UEFI), access DMA (via PCI, PCIe, FireWire) or be a storage peripheral that might pass code to the boot process (HDD/SSD/CD/DVD/BD/Flash drive/memory card firmware, including USB) or input (USB) is a potential problem.
That is a pretty damn big attack surface, and civilian researchers are able to do this too (the only big advantages Nation State Adversaries really have is funding and occasionally vendor cooperation, although I'd expect that to be rare in this case for operational security reasons - they might get datasheets under false pretenses, however, but so could we, we just wouldn't get away with it if caught <g>).
The TPM arch isn't so much of a problem here as trying to be a solution, but it falls short and has down sides too.
Supply chain integrity is a huge, possibly unsolvable problem. I'd be interested to see however some solutions to massively complicate any such attack, like an open trusted processor which boots ROM externally readable in hardware with no override and keeps secure hash chains of the firmware that loads - again, which would be externally verifiable with no way to override in firmware. That would put a crimp in their day.
One of the arguments for domestic manufacture of at least some keystone parts, and one of the reasons IBM is still in the fab business.
Bad news: your government is one of the attackers. (So is mine, unfortunately.) I take it you've seen the NSA interdiction guys taking discreet hacksaws to Cisco parcels en route to 'implant' (backdoor) them by now?
Did you think that was something that only happens abroad?
That is, they snoop on you, yes. But they don't sell you shoddy knock-offs instead of real parts, they don't give intel on you to your competitors, and they don't actually attack you Stuxnet-style. (that I know of)
I could be way off base, but as a US company I'd much prefer a US gov't backdoor to a Chinese gov't backdoor, and supply chains contaminated by knock-offs is a nightmare unto itself.
P.S. Yes, I'm in the US, and yes, you're right about "domestic"
P.P.S. IBM's fab (to my knowledge) mostly exists to serve the US gov't anyway. At least for the NSA themselves, the advantages to domestic production are there :)
http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/csw-trustnetworkcard.pdf
Network cards which support RMCP/IPMI protocol are obvious points of attack. They can reboot machines, download boot images, install a new OS, patch memory, emulate a local console, and control the entire machine. CERT has some warnings:
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-207A
If there's a default password in a network card, that's a backdoor. Here's a list of the default passwords for many common systems:
https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2013/...
"admin/admin" is popular.
The network card stores passwords in non-volatile memory. If anyone in the supply chain gets hold of the network card briefly, they can add a backdoor by plugging the card into a chassis for power, connecting a network cable, and adding a extra user/password of their own using Linux "ipmitool" running on another machine. The card, when delivered to the end user, now has a backdoor installed. If you have any servers you're responsible for, try connecting with IPMI and do a "list" command to see what users are configured. If you find any you didn't put there, big problem.
CERT warns that, if you use the same userid/password for multiple machines in your data center, discarded boards contain that password. So discarded boards must be shredded.