You are right. The Sabermetrics used in baseball by teams like the A's gave them an advantage over their competitors in 2000, but it would be crazy to think Theo Epstein and Brian Cashman haven't read Bill James.

However, I think your example is "cherry-picked" in iteself. The Rays finished only third this year, and in their whole 12 year history finished in dead last 9 times... mainly because they did not have the money to compete.

re: It would be crazy to think Theo and Cashman haven't read Bill James...

In fact, they hired him before Moneyball came out, privatized his research and are essentially the ONLY people that have been able to read him for much of the last decade.

I got to go to what seemed to be a rare Q&A with him last year, and it was pretty f-ing fascinating. He talked at length about trying to statistically evaluate leadership, chemistry, fights and catching defense contribution.

James works for the Red Sox as a consultant, and his principles are definitely behind decisions to trade players or let them leave via free agency once they hit a certain age (e.g. Garciaparra, Damon, et. al.).

As for the Yankees, there was an article recently that said something to the effect of "it's not just the size of the payroll, but their ability to spend it wisely which scares other teams".

Yes, that's true if by "consultant" you mean "they own his research." He pretty consistently checked in with a 'minder' in the auditorium to see what he could talk about. Fun stuff.

Having a low payroll does not in and of itself mean a team is trying to apply moneyball principles. It can also mean that the ownership is trying to keep costs down and doesn't care if the team is competitive as long as it's turning a profit.

The Rays were like that, until they got a new owner and dumped pretty much their entire front office right before 2006. Their best 2 seasons have been the last 2, with Andrew Friedman as head of baseball operations, and he's regularly lumped in with the moneyballers (his focus has been strong defense, something that hasn't historically been valued as highly as offense).

Theo Epstein was mentioned in the book as a believer in sabermetrics. It seems dishonest to ignore him, as the original article did.

Also I found that the article's point that the A's success was largely due to 3 20-game winning pitchers to be fallacious. Wins by pitchers aren't really a useful statistic.

The old guard will do anything they can to discredit sabremetrics so they can go back to the old ways of folklore.

It's not cherry-picking to note that several players whose obscurity and subsequent utilization by the A's were basically the focus of Lewis' book had unimpressive careers in the majors. Jeremy Brown had 10 MLB at-bats total; the book, IIRC, ends with him hitting a home run.

And again I'll just note, the author of this article is a reporter of some real repute.

Kevin Youkilis was also prominent in the book ("the greek god of walks" is how he was described). Seems to be doing quite well.

That his players had unimpressive careers is to be expected. IIRC, it was recognized in the book that any player the A's could get for cheap was by definition dysfunctional. The point wasn't that these players would become great, it was that they were a little bit better in specific ways than their salaries reflected.

But certainly Jeremy Brown was a bad example, and his 10 at bats say it all. He shouldn't have been held up as a successful acquisition.

I thought it was interesting that the reporter downplayed Lewis' focus on Barry Zito. That was the only real name I remember from the book, aside from Beane. IIRC, Zito got a good deal of coverage in Moneyball.