There's no logical reason why a central bank wouldn't lend to such a bank at the discount window even if some irrational hysteria caused its depositors to withdraw en masse, or why another bank not suffering from depositor hysteria wouldn't buy its loan portfolio.
The problem of national governments' economic policy lacking credibility is largely orthogonal[1]; central banks that underwrite private banks print money rather than borrowing it
[1]except to the extent really inept inflation-boosting fiscal policies compel the central bank to make aggressive and unanticipated interest rate rises that drive banks into insolvency.
Of course, the central bank (unless you are locked into a monetary union of course) can lend freely during a crisis. However, it must also be careful as to not trigger inflation or worse yet cause people to lose faith with your currency. There is also moral hazard as well but that's more of a soft issue.
The bigger issue is what happens if your bank liability is many times larger than your countries GDP. This was the case with Iceland or Britain. Then you can't print enough money to make your bank whole.
The financial crisis showed that bank liabilities are really liabilities of the country that the bank incorporates in. So in case of Ireland, Greece, Iceland, it is up to the country to step up and backstop their banks. If a country can not, then you will have panic on a bank. And in order for a country to be able to backstop their banks, the debt of the country must be credible.