As for point #4, and Dennett, I'm going to have to beg off discussing, because I don't want to have to resort to that kind of language before lunch. (Read: really, really not a fan.)
That's what consciousness is: to borrow Thomas Nagel's phrase (which Chalmers also uses frequently), "the thing that it feels like" to be something. By every reasonable definition I've ever heard — and I've studied and read about this stuff for decades — that's pretty much a constant: consciousness is the experiential part of ... you know, experience. Yes, it's entirely possible — even common — to be mistaken or misled about the content of your experience, but not the fact that you are experiencing.
In a discussion already absurdly full of sophistry, your comment should win a very large, gaudy prize.
"Nonetheless, just occasionally, science has dropped tantalising hints that this spooky extra ingredient might be real."
Furthermore, Point #2 attacks the use of thought experiments as a means of understand the Hard Problem. Point #3 relates to why the Hard Problem is so hard. Point #4 gives an analogy supporting Dennett's position.