> if you set things marginally high, it's a relatively easy point of not just login attack, but a DDOS attack surface as well
That's no excuse for using a worse hashing method. You need to rate-limit login attempts anyway to prevent (or at least make impractical) brute forcing / dictionary attack attempts. But it's a can of worms either way (next step is captchas because of tor / anonymizer proxies etc.).
You can also either move the computation to the client over a secure channel, or have another challenge/response method in place. I've actually thought about having a bcrypt challenge/response (from a pool of known values at the server) in order to reduce abuse of an API structure or interface. It was a thought exercise in how to approach such a method better... It was actually a thought on how to approach something like a next generation hive/bittorrent protocol to reduce the attack surface a bit.
In any case, just be careful when you implement more secure hashes with a high compute cost... it can bite you in the ass if you aren't careful.