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Re:Let's Encrypt Developer Preview by AlyssaRowan on Saturday January 17, 2015 @08:22AM (#8904278)
What I would expect is for every CA to comply with the CAB/Forum Baseline Requirements, § 10.2.4:

>If the CA or any of its designated RAs become aware that a Subscriber’s Private Key has been communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not affiliated with the Subscriber, then the CA SHALL revoke all certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the communicated Private Key.

There is no "if you pay them" condition to that. CAs are not supposed to make, or allow to stand, any signature on a compromised key—period.

Startcom's refusal to revoke all compromised public keys communicated to them after Heartbleed, and in fact their practice of charging for any revocation in general, is not in compliance with the baseline requirements for a CA.

As a result, Startcom should be removed from all browsers as a trusted CA. Let's Encrypt would be a very good replacement, especially if they also offer keys using ECC P-256 (and perhaps a subsequent replacement ECC algorithm).

Re:Let's Encrypt Developer Preview by iancarroll on Tuesday January 20, 2015 @12:22AM (#8915593)
Interesting case. This seems to contradict their own CPS as well, 4.1.9:

> A certificate will be revoked when the information it contains is suspected to be incorrect or compromised.

and

> The subscriber’s key is suspected to be compromised;

>The technical content or format of the certificate presents an unacceptable risk;

Re:Let's Encrypt Developer Preview by btreecat on Saturday January 17, 2015 @10:03AM (#8904428)
There was never any conformation that all/most/any startcom used/issued keys/certs were leaked so they were never under any obligation really.