Just don't think you will make such proxies disappear with technical means -- in particular not where they are mandated by law.
I fully agree with you when we're talking about people trying to make money by modifying 3rd party traffic.
But I leave it to the relevant legislatures (and their electorates!) to decide with respect to libraries, schools, prisons, financial traders, spies, police offices and so on.
With respect to HTTP/2 there were two choices:
1) Try to use the protocol to force a particular political agenda through.
2) Make the protocol such that people behind manipulating proxies have notice that this is so, and leave the question of which proxies whould be there to the political systems.
Implementing policy with protocols or standardisation has never worked and it won't work this time either.
At the end of the day: IETF has no army, NSA is part of one.
In fact, the uses of proxies that you seem to be pointing out as examples of why ubiquitous encryption is a "bad thing" - such as those in schools, homes, workplaces, etc. to block "objectionable content" - would probably be better handled by blocking IP addresses or domain names, rather than trying to break into encrypted HTTP sessions, would it not? Last I checked, TLS does not prevent the ability to detect when a user agent attempts to access a particular host (whether by IP address or domain name), thus allowing $BIGSITE to close off access to blacklisted or non-whitelisted hosts without needing to know the exact data being exchanged.
Honestly, and with all due respect, the idea that ubiquitous use of TLS would in any way, shape, or form stifle $BIGSITE's ability to monitor and block attempts to access "objectionable" sites seems absurd when there are plenty of more effective ways to do such things that don't involve a total compromise of privacy or secrecy.