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Re:HTTP/2.0 — Bad protocol, bad politics by mike_hearn on Wednesday January 07, 2015 @10:52AM (#8851166)
After all, what use is a certification authority, if basically any authoritarian state and intelligence service can get on that list?

Who says what an authoritarian state is? The reason there are a lot of CAs and some of them are governments is that having rules and policies for what it takes to be a CA is way better than having some random neckbeard at a browser maker deciding he read something in the newspaper yesterday about your country he didn't like, so you can't be a CA.

If you wanted to, you could build a browser that's a fork of Firefox/Chrome, and just doesn't show the padlock when a CA that you believe is under the thumb of an authoritarian state is the signer. However you would then have to exclude all American and British CA's, which would then exclude most SSLd sites, thus making your fork not much different to just deciding to never show any padlock at all and assert that everything is insecure so fuck it, let's (not) go shopping.

OK ..... back here in reality, real browser makers understand that there are more adversaries than governments, and actually SSL was designed to make online shopping safer, not be a tool of revolution. Judged by the "make shopping safer" standard it does a pretty great job. Judged by the "fight repressive regime and save the world" standard, it still does a surprisingly good job - the NSA doesn't seem to like it much at all - but it's unrealistic to expect an internet protocol designed in the mid 90s to do that.

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