Not quite so sure about signatures, but that's more a PKIX WG problem with more (CA-style) inertia behind it, so that won't move very quickly no matter what. The chairs want to resolve signatures after the curve and key exchange algorithm, which the TLS WG participants seem to want sorted out first.
I thought Google was pushing for it to be adopted in TLS 1.3. Did everyone else reject that idea or what happened?
However, Apple probably won't support Curve25519 without a standard, and Microsoft definitely won't: they have a competing proposal. Which will leave the NIST curves widely used across the web as well, because IE and Safari support is critically important.
I know MS will be dicks and try to force their own version of everything, but i'll bet Apple will implement anything that there's a half-decent reference implementation of. That just leaves Microsoft, and the easiest way to defeat their proposal is to get their customers to demand they support the thing everyone else already implements, which would be Curve25519.
1. DJB criticizes NIST and other standardization institutes and their curve selection choices
2. CFRG fails to recommend a curve (or a suite of curves) for TLS WG
3. Microsoft refuses to adopt Curve25519
4. Everyone else does
5. Interop problems
6. ?????
7. Everyone who has to clean up after this is aligned strongly towards standardization processes.
That's how they are a problem.
(For the record: This isn't a conspiracy theory, I don't think anyone wants this to happen and is actively trying to manipulate things to make it happen, it's merely a hypothesis on what could happen.)
As far as I'm aware there's still no real progress on getting better curves (e.g. curve25519) into TLS, despite a lot of noise on the ML, which is a real shame.
Better curves would also be faster - so it's not "just" a security thing.
There's a good overview of available curves here, with a guide to their safety: http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/