Sort of. There's still a lot of rent-seeking. Consider this (egregiously) common pattern:
1. Release new wonder drug.
2. Rake in money until patent expires.
3. Make minor tweak to wonder drug, just enough that you can get a new patent.
4. Don't worry that this new version isn't as effective as the original. Just send armies of drug reps to badger doctors into prescribing it anyway. They'll go along with it; they don't have the time to read the medical literature and figure out for themselves that the old version with the expired patent is still a better drug.
5. GOTO 2
3. Discover that the same drug works for a different disease and patent the new application of the old drug.
4. Since the drug is still patented even after the original patent has expired, anyone making the drug still has to pay up even if they are selling it for the original, out of patent, use.
If you patent for disease A, then the patent expires, even if you patent for disease B, it doesn't stop anyone from making a generic version of your drug to treat disease A. Doctors will also prescribe that generic for disease B (there is nothing to stop them).
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/11/pfizer-caught-gam...
What happens all too often when drug patents expire is that no one manufactures the drug at all, because the people with the capacity to do so get better returns manufacturing things that are still under patent (even if that's a newer but less effective treatment for the same condition, or even if it leaves no effective treatment for a condition available.)
1. Your patent on drug A expires
2. You have an active patent monopoly on drug B which is functionally similar
3. You use your giant network of marketing staff to convince medical professionals to use B instead of A
4. The market for A collapses due to lack of demand.
The generics manufacturers cannot afford to spend nearly as much bribing doctors, so you don't get an equivalent demand push for generics unless one of the competing large pharma groups decide that the generic is profitable enough to counter the targeted campaign with a targeted campaign of their own. But why would they, when they can milk their own patent monopoly cashcows a bit more using the same marketing spend.
(My foot is fine, I got a cold, yay hospitals)
Doctor's inboxes are filled with emails from drug company reps offering to take them out to play golf and fancy dinners and give them boxes of free samples of the drugs made by the companies they rep. Those companies don't sell the low cost generics!
(source: a relative of mine is a drug company rep!)
I'd want to hire people who are knowledgeable about pharmaceuticals and are able to accurately and intelligently answer questions about research studies and side effects. But an effective person would probably hire hot chicks and chatty dudes and give them big expense accounts.
Yes, the original manufacturer often spends money to develop follow on versions that can qualify for new patents, but this isn't always an effective strategy. When it is, it's usually because the follow on version has substantial benefits for patients (e.g., monthly infusions at the doctor's office instead of weekly). If those benefits aren't there, insurers can and will decline to cover the new form of the drug and insist on the generic.
[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/business/use-of-generics-p...
If they abandon it, and no generic is produced, patients are forced to the patented alternatives.
The drug companies don't want to compete with their own products if they can avoid doing so.
The different outcomes are largely explained thus:
Drugs with a very large demand and especially ones which are OTC and around which consumer brands can be developed (where brand identity allows a premium to be charged, substituting in some degree for the monopoly rents patents allow) are likely to continue to be manufactured after patents expire. Prescription drugs with a limited demand even if they are the best (or only) effective treatment for a particular condition are less likely to continue to be produced once patent protection expires..
So despite the fact that the generic is legally available within the NHS, Pfizer seems willing to chase doctors who prescribe it for pain relief.
http://boingboing.net/2014/12/24/pfizer-threatens-pharmacist...
(edited to make sense, thanks to jameshart)
To prescribe is to define a desirable course of action. To proscribe is to define an undesirable course of action. Doctors prescribe medicines; laws proscribe crimes.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-label_use
I don't know to what extent manufacturers can limit prescribing their branded drugs for off-label use. I feel like if I wrote a Rx for any drug for any indication, it would get filled without hassle... although if it was really outlandish, the Pharmacist would probably give me a call.
Source: I'm a doctor.
Pfizer here are not trying to limit prescribing their branded drugs for off-label use, they are trying to restrict the available uses of products that are legally supplied to the NHS by other companies.
The insurance companies get to spend less paying for treatment, and using the tax system gets around the public goods problem which prevents insurers from doing this voluntarily.
That makes no sense. If you put a limit on potential returns by instituting a fixed "X-prize", why would companies continue to invest in R&D? Wouldn't they just pick the cheapest to develop drugs in order to maximize their return?
http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm
Funding report by disease/research area:
http://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx
Note: Over a billion dollars a year is spent on stem cell research.
We should at least publicly-fund antibiotics research, given that the current system is almost completely failing on that front.
I'd think it would be better to tie the temporary exclusivity to who put it thru the approval process directly (and relax the restrictions a bit, but that's a separate issue...).
I think this is the most important part of your comment. How well patents work for drugs is a secondary question.
I would put it this way: the PTO has no good way of distinguishing mere novelty from nonobviousness. In a mature field, the two probably correlate pretty well: everything obvious will have been thought of. But in a young field, they don't. Specifically, when a new technology opens up new applications, those applications are often novel enough to be considered patentable, even when they are obvious to anyone who has the need that the application addresses.
When new technologies are extremely general, like personal computers and the Internet, this problem is at its worst: there are very large numbers of such new applications. And so we get lots of patent applications of the form "do X on a computer" or "do X over the Internet", and because those ideas are novel, as far as the PTO can tell, it assumes they are nonobvious.
The European patent court, as I understand, tries to address this problem by requiring that a patented invention demonstrate a "novel technical effect". I think this is a good idea: it attempts to distinguish inventions that are truly new technology from those that are simply novel applications of technology, the implication being that the latter are more likely to be obvious, even though novel. In fact, I think this is a much better approach than the one the US Supreme Court took in the recent Alice decision [0], in which they rejected a patent for being about an "abstract idea". Both approaches require the PTO to make a judgment, but the question of whether an invention is an "abstract idea" seems to me much harder to pin down (what's a non-abstract idea?) than that of whether it contributes to technology or merely uses technology. (Though I wouldn't say the latter question is always going to be trivial.)
Another thing I would like to see is heavier and more consistent reliance on what are called the "Graham factors" [1], particularly those that show objective evidence of nonobviousness: commercial success; long-felt but unsolved needs; and failure of others to solve the same problem. I would go so far as to say that the presumption, particularly in a young field, should be that an invention, notwithstanding its novelty, should be considered to be obvious unless the applicant can demonstrate some objective evidence that it isn't.
[0] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_Corp._v._CLS_Bank_Interna... [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inventive_step_and_non-obviousn...
However, if you look at most fields (ex: engine design) they benifit from the same thing. In the end the real issue is new fields spend their first ~50 years in patent hell where the most obvious things are easily patented and you can't default to a 20 year old 'safe' design without major compromize.