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Re:Dark Mail Technical Alliance by substack on Thursday January 01, 2015 @09:04AM (#8822936)
The proposal for forward secrecy in the spec (https://darkmail.info/downloads/dark-internet-mail-environme...) is not great and does not reflect the current state of the art:

> PFS for message objects, as the description above suggests, is far more difficult, and contrary to the nature of email.

It recommends just rotating public keys every few days with a paranoid mode. A much better solution is to implement the Axolotl Ratchet pioneered by Open Whisper Systems for TechSecure:

https://www.whispersystems.org/blog/advanced-ratcheting/

https://github.com/trevp/axolotl/wiki

With Axolotl Ratchet, you get:

* forward secrecy - disclosure of private keys doesn't let an attacker in the future go back and read encrypted communication

* future secrecy - disclosure of ephemeral private keys doesn't disclose (much) future content

I also get the feeling from a glance reading the spec that way too much trust is being placed on service providers. That there is even such a category as "trustful" where the server has access to your private keys is a huge red flag and that was exactly the problem with lavabit: http://www.thoughtcrime.org/blog/lavabit-critique/

Re:Dark Mail Technical Alliance by higherpurpose on Thursday January 01, 2015 @09:33AM (#8823008)
Adam Langley's Pond uses it, but I don't know why there hasn't been any progress on that lately. Is the Pond design just too complex/difficult to implement with a good UI, or just because of his lack of time?

https://pond.imperialviolet.org/

Re:Dark Mail Technical Alliance by joepie91_ on Thursday January 01, 2015 @09:44AM (#8823040)
I don't really understand why people are trying to reinvent something that has already been figured out. That kind of NIH behaviour is absolutely lethal in the world of cryptography.