I think the difference is a bit more subtle. When not using a password manager, you rely on an array of sites and services with varying levels of security to authenticate, transmit, and store passwords. With a password manager you store the database, your master password isn't transmitted anywhere, and you're storing everything locally. You could even choose to air gap your password manager if you wanted.
You're still vulnerable some attacks like keyloggers but I think your description downplays many of the benefits (mitm or a poorly secured remote database wouldn't expose your master password). There are other great features password managers are starting to add; letting you know how long ago you changed your password, informing you if you haven't changed a password after a site had been compromised, changing your password for you (each site is different and updating passwords is very time consuming).
I believe using a password manager is better than not using anything and relying a single password for many accounts. One thing about a password manager is that you control its contents and so I believe the risks can be mitigated.
The following is a password manager developed by Bruce Schneier:
Re:Nvidia Corporate Network Breached
by raverbashing on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @12:55PM
(#8820270)
"and relying a single password for many accounts"
Then don't.
I rely on similar passwords for non-important services, but important ones have an unique password/2FA
Have your master pw compromised: have all passwords compromised
You're taking multiple failure points (which certainly has a higher chance of a failure than a single failure point) and replacing it with a single point, with lower chance of failure BUT with bigger consequences